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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS
Sergiy Stetsenko
Iourii Manovskii

This dissertation consists of two essays studying macroeconomics questions about labor
markets. The research in this document is separated into chapters that study distinct
features of aggregate labor market outcomes.
The first essay documents the change in behavior of fertility rate at business cycle frequencies in the United States between the 1970s and 1990s and shows how the cyclical and
secular properties of fertility can be used to distinguish among several proposed theories
that account for the rise in labor force participation of married mothers. The model, in
which households make fertility, female labor force participation and asset accumulation
decisions, is estimated using data for the 1960s and 1970s. The model shows how fertility and women’s labor participation decisions are related and replicates countercyclical
fertility. The changes in the determinants of female labor supply are introduced into the
model and the implications for female labor force participation and properties of fertility
are analyzed.
The second essay (co-authored with Marcus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii) studies
the relation between taxes and the unemployment rate using the Mortensen and Pissarides
search and matching equilibrium theory of unemployment. The proposed quantitative
model with ex-ante worker skill heterogeneity and two technology shocks is consistent with
a strong response of labor market variables to cyclical fluctuations in productivity and a
iv

relatively weak response to changes in tax rates. The model also matches the properties
of group-specific labor market variables. The key to achieve these results is endogenous
response of aggregate and group-specific productivities.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
This dissertation consists of two independent essays on the macroeconomics of labor markets: “Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility”(Chapter 2) and “Taxation and
Unemployment” (Chapter 3).
In the first essay I study the interaction between timing of fertility and female labor
force participation decisions. There has been an increase in labor force participation of
married women, especially women with young children, between the 1970s and 1990s, fact
which has received substantial attention in the literature. Over the same period, cyclical
and secular properties of fertility have changed significantly. In particular, I document that
fertility is strongly countercyclical at business cycle frequencies in the 1960s and 1970s and
procyclical thereafter. In addition, women have postponed childbearing substantially.
Using a life-cycle incomplete markets model with aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, I show that cyclical properties and timing of fertility are related to labor force
participation decisions of married women. The model calibrated to 1960s and 1970s generates countercyclical fertility. The intuition is the following: women with a high value of
staying home prefer to have a child earlier, stay at home and save on child care costs; those
at the margin between working and staying home prefer to have a child during a recession.

1

Women who are relatively more productive in the market prefer to have a child later and
pay child care costs without leaving the workforce. They prefer to give birth during an
expansion as a way to smooth consumption. The size of the latter group is relatively small
in the 1960s and 1970s and the countercyclical effect dominates.
A number of explanations that have been proposed to account for the increase in female
labor supply, in particular a decrease in the gender wage gap, an increase in women’s
returns to experience and a decrease in child care costs. All of these mechanisms either
treat fertility as exogenous or do not model fertility at all. Nevertheless, fertility would
have been affected by each of the proposed mechanisms had it been a choice. The objective
of this work is to nest various mechanisms that explain the rise in married women’s labor
supply combined with fertility choice and to analyze their impact on properties of fertility.
I introduce these changes into the calibrated model and evaluate the implications for
female labor force participation and properties of fertility. I find that each of them separately and all combined can explain some but not all features of the data. Taking into
account the flattening of life-cycle earnings profile for males helps to account for the data
but a significant discrepancy remains.
In the second essay we study the interaction between taxation and unemployment.
A leading theory of equilibrium unemployment, the search and matching Mortensen and
Pissarides model, has an important limitation for studying the effects of policies such as
taxation. A one percentage point permanent decrease in productivity and a one percentage
point permanent increase in labor income or sales taxes increase unemployment by the
same amount. However, the data suggest that the elasticity with respect to productivity
necessary to replicate business cycles is considerably larger than the elasticity with respect
to taxes required to explain cross-country differences.
We propose a framework that can resolve this dilemma. The problem is that produc-

2

tivity is exogenous in the standard model and do not respond to changes in tax rates.
We endogenize productivity allowing for ex-ante heterogeneity in skill (high and low) that
interact on the production side of the economy.
We find that: 1) the model with ex-ante worker heterogeneity accounts well for the
cyclical behavior of labor market variables in the aggregate and for each group, 2) the
response of unemployment to changes in taxes is substantially reduced relative to the
homogeneous model.

3

Chapter 2

Female Labor Force Participation
and Fertility
2.1

Introduction

A fact that received substantial attention in the literature is that there has been an increase
in labor force participation of married women, especially women with young children,
between the 1970s and 1990s. For example, the employment rate has increased from 15%
to 37% for married women with an infant and from 54% to 70% for married women without
children under the age of 18 from 1970 to 1990.
A number of explanations have been proposed to account for the increase in the labor
supply of married women between the 1970s and 1990s.1 Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan
(2003) argue that the decline in the gender wage gap can explain the increase in the
average hours of work for married women. Olivetti (2006) argues that the increase in
women’s returns to experience can account for the changes in women’s hours of work.
Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) find that the reduction in the cost of children
1

A number of other studies focus on earlier period, for example, Greenwood, Seshardi, and Yorukoglu

(2005) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) among others.
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and in the gender wage gap combined can explain the increase in labor force participation
of married mothers. All of these papers either treat fertility as exogenous or do not model
fertility at all. Nevertheless, each of the proposed mechanisms would have had an impact
on fertility had it been a choice. If women expect cyclical movements in their income
and spend some time away from market work during pregnancy and upon birth, then
parents prefer to time a birth when income is low. The procyclical response may result if
households are liquidity constrained. Women who stay in the workforce when they have
a child and outsource child care prefer to time a birth when income is high as a way to
smooth consumption.
A strong impact of young children and time spent on child care on labor force participation of mothers is confirmed by the studies of Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Hotz and
Miller (1988). Women’s attachment to the labor force and the time at which they start
childbearing are also connected.2 Women who are relatively more productive at home are
likely to have children early in the life-cycle. Women who are relatively more productive
at work and outsource child care are likely to have children later, when household income
is higher, if households face liquidity constraints.3 Different mechanisms that lead to the
increase in female labor supply may affect fertility behavior in different ways.
Indeed, I document that there have been significant changes in the cyclical properties
of fertility simultaneous with the change in female labor supply. In particular, the fertility
rate is strongly countercyclical in the 1960s and 1970s and becomes procyclical thereafter in
the United States. More specifically, the correlation of the fertility rate with the business
2

The studies by Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002), Conesa (2000) and Mullin and Wang (2002) find

a strong link between the timing of fertility over the life-cycle and women’s labor supply decisions.
3
Goldin and Katz (2002) argue that the diffusion of the birth control pill in the 1960s had a significant
influence on women’s career decisions. The diffusion of the pill could lower the cost of professional education
and lead to a delay in fertility. At the same time, Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002) find that changes
in the length of women’s education can explain at most 30% of fertility delay.
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cycle is negative for younger mothers (25 years old or less) in both periods. For older
mothers (above 25 years old) it is slightly positive in the former period and strongly
positive in the latter period, and this change accounts for the overall change. There has
also been a delay in fertility over the same period as pointed out in the literature. For
example, the average age of mothers at first birth has increased from 21.4 in 1970 to 24.2
in 1990.4
Scientific interest in the relationship between births and economic activity was significant at the end of 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century in the United
States. Silver (1965) surveys the findings covering various time periods from 1870 until
1957. Procyclical behavior of births has been established as one of the strongest empirical
observations of that time.5 Taking this finding into account, there have been two changes
in the cyclicality of the fertility rate: around 1960 and around 1980. The focus of this work
is on the latter change, although the economic forces that shape cyclical properties of fertility are likely the same in the earlier period. In a related work, Jones and Schoonbroodt
(2007) show that fertility is procyclical in a stochastic version of the dynastic model between 1910 and 1970. They consider 10-year period fluctuations in productivity, not the
business cycle frequency fluctuations.
The objective of this work is to nest various mechanisms explaining the rise in married
women’s labor supply combined with fertility choice and to analyze their impact on secular
and cyclical properties of fertility. I also want to understand what features of the model
are needed to account for the cyclical properties of the fertility rate. I consider a life-cycle
overlapping generations model with aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, female labor
force participation, fertility and asset accumulation decisions. Women’s productivity at
4

For more evidence of fertility delay since 1970s, see studies by Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002),

Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997) and Rindfuss, Morgan, and Offutt (1996).
5
See, for example, Galbraith and Thomas (1941)
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home is stochastic. A woman with a child saves on child care costs if she stays home. I
allow for asset accumulation because the role of fertility timing as a tool for consumption
smoothing may be exaggerated without assets. I calibrate the model parameters to match
the facts about married women’s employment and fertility in 1960s and 1970s. Cyclical
behavior of fertility is not targeted.
The model calibrated to the first period produces countercyclical fertility driven by
younger women as in the data. The intuition is the following: women with high value of
staying home prefer to have a child earlier, stay at home and save on child care costs; those
at the margin between working and staying home prefer to have a child during a recession.
Women who are relatively more productive in the market prefer to have a child later and
pay child care costs without leaving the workforce. They prefer to give birth during an
expansion as a way to smooth consumption. The size of the latter group is relatively small
in the 1960s and 1970s and the countercyclical effect dominates.
The results of the benchmark model show that cyclical properties of fertility and timing
of fertility over the life-cycle are closely related to labor force participation decisions of
married women. The proposed mechanisms that lead to the increase in women’s labor
supply may have different impacts on women with relatively high productivity in the
market and women with relatively high productivity at home and thus, secular and cyclical
properties of fertility. One of the goals of this work is to evaluate which mechanisms are
consistent with observed properties of fertility.
I introduce changes in the determinants of female labor supply (a decrease in the gender
wage gap, an increase in women’s returns to experience, a decrease in child care costs) into
the benchmark model and analyze the implications for female labor force participation and
fertility. The decrease in the gender wage gap and the increase in the returns to experience
for women separately can explain about a half of the increase in participation of mothers

7

with an infant and women without children. The decrease in child care costs can account
for about a third of the increase in participation of mothers with an infant and does not
affect participation of women without children. The decrease in the gender wage gap and
the increase in the returns to experience lead to a delay in fertility, while the decrease
in child care costs decreases the average age at first birth. Each alternative decreases
the negative correlation of fertility with the business cycle for younger women and overall
but does not change the correlation for older women. Combining all three alternatives
together can account for the increase in participation of women without children and
overshoots slightly the participation of mothers with an infant. It does not lead to a
delay in fertility observed in the data and leads to overall procyclical fertility, but driven
by younger women, not older as in the data. Summarizing the findings, each alternative
separately can explain some but not all features of the data and the decrease in child care
costs is the least successful candidate.
A change in the earnings of husbands can potentially have an impact on women’s labor
participation and fertility. As documented in Kambourov and Manovskii (2005), there has
been a significant flattening of life-cycle earnings profiles for the successive cohorts of male
workers entering the labor market starting from late 1960s. I find that this change can
account for about 15% of the increase in participation of mothers with an infant and about
a half of the increase in participation of women without children. It leads to a delay in
fertility and stronger countercyclical fertility driven by younger women. Combined with
other alternatives, it leads to a delay in fertility and dampens the strong procyclical fertility
rate for younger women, though it is not enough to generate the change in the cyclical
properties of fertility observed in the data. The effect on the cyclical behavior of fertility
for older women is very small.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical facts that
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motivate the paper, in particular facts about married women’s participation and cyclical
and secular behavior of fertility. In section 3, I develop a quantitative life-cycle overlapping generations model with discrete employment and fertility choices and aggregate and
idiosyncratic uncertainty. In section 4, I describe how I calibrate the model parameters
to match the facts about married women’s employment and fertility in 1960s and 1970s.
Section 5 presents the results of the benchmark model. In Section 6, I conduct quantitative
experiments for the changes in the determinants of women’s labor supply and discuss their
results. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2.2

Facts

In this section, I describe the facts about fertility and married women labor force participation. The data sources I use come from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), United States Census of Population, Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and Current Population Survey (CPS). The variables and data sources are described in Appendix
3.7.1.

2.2.1

Employment

In Table 2.1, I report employment rates for married women with their first child less than
one year old and married women without children under age 18 in 1970 and 1990. The
employment rate more than doubled from 15% to 37% for women with an infant and
increased from 54% to 70% for women without children under age of 18 during that time.
There has been an increase in the proportion of educated women during the period
of study. It is possible that changes in women’s labor force participation are driven by
differences in education. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the employment rate for married

9

Table 2.1: Employment Rate, 22-44 Year Old Married Women.

1970

1990

Women with first child under age 1

0.145

0.372

Women with no children under age 18

0.544

0.701

Source: US Census of Population. Employment rate is the proportion of women who worked more than
30 hours during a reference week.

women with their first child less than one year old along with the proportion of women by
educational attainment for 1970 and 1990. First, we can see that the employment rate of
married women with their first child less than one year old is approximately the same for all
four education categories in 1970 and higher for all groups in 1990, with the increase being
larger for more educated women. To understand the role of changes in education, I carry
out a simple counterfactual experiment. Suppose that education distribution had remained
fixed as in 1970 and only participation behavior had changed. The employment rate would
have increased from 0.145 to 0.352. Assuming that participation choices had stayed the
same and education distribution had changed the employment rate would have changed
from 0.145 to 0.140. These calculations show that the increase in labor participation of
married women with an infant is not due to a composition effect.
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows the same statistics as in Panel A for married women without
children under age 18. Unlike for women with a child, the employment rate is higher for
more educated women comparing to their less educated counterparts in 1970. If education
distribution had remained fixed as in 1970 and participation behavior had changed the
employment rate would have increased from 0.544 to 0.640. If participation choices had
stayed the same and education distribution had changed the employment rate would have
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Table 2.2: Employment Rate, 22-44 Year Old Married Women by Education.

1970
Education

Employment Rate

1990
Proportion

Employment Rate

Proportion

Panel A: First Child Less Than 1 Year Old.

Less Than High School

0.140

0.11

0.218

0.04

High School

0.160

0.49

0.351

0.27

Some College

0.136

0.23

0.385

0.36

College and Higher

0.128

0.17

0.394

0.33

Panel B: No Children Under Age 18.

Less Than High School

0.415

0.25

0.438

0.08

High School

0.593

0.41

0.659

0.30

Some College

0.579

0.18

0.734

0.33

College and Higher

0.645

0.16

0.804

0.29

Source: US Census of Population. Note: Employment rate is the proportion of women who worked more
than 30 hours during a reference week.

increased from 0.544 to 0.589. These results imply that while the composition effect plays
a role, it cannot account for the rise in employment of married women without children
entirely.
In Table 2.3, I report average hours worked per person, average hours worked conditional on employment, employment rate and full-time employment rate for married women
in 1970 and 1990. We can see that there has been a large increase in average hours worked
and only a marginal increase in hours worked conditional on employment between 1970
and 1990. At the same time, there has been a sharp rise in the employment rate and
11

Table 2.3: Employment Rate and Hours Worked, 22-44 Year Old Married Women.

1970

1990

Average Hours

13.6

23.4

Average Hours, Employed

33.8

35.9

Employment Rate

0.42

0.68

Full-Time Employment Rate

0.29

0.51

Source: March CPS. Note: Employment rate is the proportion of women who are employed during a
reference week. Full-time employment rate is the proportion of women who worked more than 30 hours
during a reference week.

full-time employment rate. These statistics suggest the main change in women’s labor
supply occurred along the extensive margin. Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)
reach the same conclusion using PSID data.

2.2.2

Fertility

Cyclical Properties of Fertility
First, consider the behavior of fertility over the business cycle at aggregate level. I use
labor productivity, defined as business output per worker, as a business cycle indicator.
Table 2.4 shows the correlation between the business cycle frequency components of the
fertility rate and productivity for two periods, 1961-1981 and 1982-2007. The difference
between two periods is remarkable. The fertility rate is countercyclical in period one and
procyclical in period two.6
Since I am interested in the fertility decision rather than birth itself, I use productivity
lagged four quarters and also report the results for three and five quarter lags. Other com6

I use the band pass filter instead of the Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend the series, because it allows

for the isolation of business cycle frequencies and removes the high frequency noise from the fertility rate
series. The results for series detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter are qualitatively similar.
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Table 2.4: Correlation of Fertility Rate and Productivity: 1961Q1-2007Q4.

Period I

Period II

1961-1981

1982-2007

Productivity Lagged 3 Quarters

-0.45

0.48

Productivity Lagged 4 Quarters

-0.38

0.50

Productivity Lagged 5 Quarters

-0.29

0.44

Source: Fertility rate - National Center for Health Statistics. Productivity - BLS. Note: Fertility rate number of births per 1000 women aged 15-44 years. The quarterly series is obtained by averaging the
original seasonally adjusted monthly data. Productivity is business output per worker. Both variables are
detrended using band pass filter with frequency parameters 6 and 32 for quarterly data.

monly used cyclical indicators, such as output and unemployment, are clearly endogenous
with respect to fertility and participation decisions. The results based on these indicators
are presented in Appendix 2.8.3 and confirm the findings reported here.
The choice of the break point, year 1981, is illustrated by Figure 2.1, which shows the
detrended fertility rate and productivity series, with the latter lagged four quarters. We
can see that the change in cyclicality of fertility occurred around 1981.7
Figure 2.2 shows the change in cyclicality of the fertility rate graphically. The solid
line shows the correlation of the fertility rate with productivity lagged four quarters over
the eighty quarters, with the last observation given by the value of the coordinate on the
horizontal axis. Dotted lines show a 95% confidence interval.
Next, I use SIPP data to document the relationship between births and the business
cycle at a more disaggregated level. I use the data from a 1984 survey for the first period
and a 2001 survey for the second period. The details of the sample construction are
described in Appendix 3.7.1. Using the data on the date of birth and link to mother for
every individual, I construct fertility and marital histories for all women and estimate the
7

The results presented in Table 2.4 are not sensitive to the choice of the break point.
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Figure 2.1: Fertility Rate and Productivity Lagged 4 Quarters, Percent Deviation from
Trend.
0.06
Fertility Rate
Productivity

0.05

Percent Deviation from Trend

0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
−0.01
−0.02
−0.03
−0.04
1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985
Year

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Source: Fertility rate - National Center for Health Statistics. Productivity - BLS. Note: Fertility rate number of births per 1000 women aged 15-44 years. The quarterly series is obtained by averaging the
original seasonally adjusted monthly data. Productivity is business output per worker. Both variables are
detrended using band pass filter with frequency parameters 6 and 32 for quarterly data.

following linear probability model:
bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit ,

(2.1)

where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the
percentage deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4. The sample is restricted
to married women. Table 2.5 shows the results.
I report the results restricting the age at birth to start from 15 to be consistent with
statistics based on aggregate data described above and from 22 as will be relevant for the
quantitative analysis below.8 They are very similar to the results for the aggregate series,
8

Data limitations do not allow me to use exactly the same periods as for aggregate series.
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Figure 2.2: Correlation of Fertility Rate and Productivity Lagged 4 Quarters over the

Correlation of Fertility Rate and Productivity Lagged 4 Quarters

Previous 80 Quarters.

0.8
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0.2
0
−0.2
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−0.8
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1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Source: Fertility rate - National Center for Health Statistics. Productivity - BLS. Note: Fertility rate
- births per 1000 women aged 15-44 years. The quarterly series is obtained by averaging the original
seasonally adjusted monthly data. Productivity is business output per worker. Both variables are detrended
using band pass filter with frequency parameters 6 and 32 for quarterly data. For a given quarter, the
correlation between the detrended series is computed over the previous 80 quarters and represented by a
solid line. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals.

with the probability of birth being countercyclical in the 1960s and 1970s and procyclical
thereafter. These results also suggest that the change in the cyclicality of fertility is driven
by the change in behavior of older women. While βˆ1 is negative in both periods for younger
women, it is slightly positive in the first period and strongly positive in the second period
for older women. The results provided in Appendix 2.8.3 show that the findings of this
subsection hold for women with different level of education and for the first births only.
Secular Properties of Fertility
Table 2.6 shows that the average age of mothers at first birth has increased from 21.4
in 1970 to 24.2 in 1990.
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Table 2.5: Probability of Birth over the Business Cycle, SIPP Data.

Period I

Period II

1966-1981

1984-2003

Age Group

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

Age 22-44

-0.024 (0.025)

0.178 (0.027)

Age 22-25

-0.116 (0.049)

-0.077 (0.057)

Age 26-44

0.023 (0.028)

0.226 (0.030)

Age 15-44

-0.032 (0.021)

0.093 (0.024)

Age 15-25

-0.085 (0.030)

-0.160 (0.040)

Note: Estimates from the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives
birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t − 4.

Table 2.6: Average Age of Mother at First Birth.

1970

1990

21.4

24.2

Source: Natinal Center for Health Statistics.
Table 2.7 illustrates this delay in fertility from a different angle. The share of first time
mothers who are 25 years old or younger decreases from 78% in 1970 to 41% in 1990.

2.3

The Model

In this section, I describe the model I use to analyze the change in cyclical properties
of fertility and the link between the changes in women’s labor force participation and
properties of fertility. I consider a stochastic life-cycle overlapping generations model with
aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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Table 2.7: Share of First Time Mothers with an Infant by Age.

Age

1970

1990

15-21

0.42

0.16

22-25

0.36

0.25

26-30

0.17

0.36

31-44

0.05

0.23

Source: US Census of Population.

2.3.1

Environment

The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents. The unit of analysis is a
unitary household. Each household consists of a wife and her husband. In each period, a
new generation of households of measure one enters the economy at age j1 . Households
live T periods with certainty and leave the economy at age J.
Preferences
The expected lifetime utility of a household is:
E

J
X

β j−j1 U (cj , nj , vj ; ej ),

(2.2)

j=j1

where cj - household’s consumption, nj ∈ {0, 1} - number of children in the household,
vj - value of wife staying home, β ∈ (0, 1) - discount factor and ej - equivalence scale for
consumption. Successive cohorts of households are different depending on realization of
aggregate shock but I suppress the time index for convenience.
Stochastic Processes
Since this work studies the cyclical properties of fertility, an aggregate shock is an
essential ingredient of the model. Each period, a household faces aggregate shock, which
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is assumed to follow AR(1) process:
log z ′ = ρz log z + ǫz , ǫz ∼ N (0, σz2 ),

(2.3)

where ǫz is standard normal random variable with standard deviation σz . Women’s productivity at home is stochastic. A household entering the economy draws a value of home
production for wife from a random distribution. Each period, wife’s home production
value is disturbed by idiosyncratic shock and evolves according to AR(1) process during
the life-cycle:
log v ′ = ρv log v + ǫv , ǫv ∼ N (0, σv2 ).

(2.4)

The initial value, vj1 , is drawn from the stationary distribution of v. The parameter µv is
used to locate the mean of the distribution of v:
v := v − µv .

(2.5)

Earnings
Husband and wife are endowed with one unit of time each. A husband plays a simple
role in the model, he works and brings income to the household. I assume that husband
always works since the participation rate is close to one for working age married men.9
Husband’s human capital, kjh , depends exogenously on his age j. Husband’s earnings
depend on the level of his human capital and aggregate state of the economy:
log yjh = log z + log kjh .

(2.6)

Since a woman’s labor supply decision is essential in this study, women are modeled in a
more complicated way. As shown in Table 2.3, the major change in the labor supply of
women occurred along the extensive margin. Based on this result, I assume that market
9

See, for example Blau (1998).
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time is indivisible and wife can either work in the market or stay home. Earnings of age
j wife depend on the aggregate state of the economy and level of her human capital kjw :
log yjw = log z + log kjw .

(2.7)

Contrary to her husband, wife’s human capital is determined endogenously depending on
her employment history:
w
kj+1
= kjw + (η0 + η1 j)kjw I(Ej = 1),

(2.8)

where I(.) - indicator function. The level of wife’s human capital in the next period
depends on the current level of human capital and the amount of human capital acquired
on the job if she works in the current period. As in Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008) and Olivetti (2006), I assume that the increase in human capital associated with
one more year of work depends on age and diminishes with age if η1 < 0.
Budget Constraints
Each period, household income consists of the income of the husband, the income of
the wife if she is employed and assets brought from the previous period. The income is
divided into consumption, assets carried into the next period and the cost of child care,
which is paid if there is a child under age 18 in the household and wife works in the market:
yjh + yjw I(Ej = 1) + a = c +

a′
+ pc G(d)I(Ej = 1),
(1 + r)

(2.9)

where G(d) - units of child care required for a child of age d and I(.) - indicator function.
Price per unit of child care is denoted by pc . I assume that households can borrow up to
a certain limit, so that:
a′ ≥ amin .

(2.10)

Households enter the economy with zero assets,
aj1 = 0,
19

(2.11)

and cannot leave the economy in debt:
aJ+1 ≥ 0.

2.3.2

(2.12)

Household Decision Problem

Consider the dynamic programming problem of age j household. Denote the household’s
value if wife works by W (x, d), the household’s value if wife stays home by H(x, d). A
household state is given by x := (z, j, kw , v, a) and d, where d is the age of child.
The value function for a household without children ever born is given by:
V (x, 0) = maxa′ {max{W (x, 0), H(x, 0)}},

(2.13)

W (x, 0) = U (c, 0, 0) + βmax{EV (x′ , 0), E(pj V (x′ , 1) + (1 − pj )V (x′ , 0))},

(2.14)

H(x, 0) = U (c, 0, v) + βmax{E(V (x′ , 0), E(pj V (x′ , 1) + (1 − pj )V (x′ , 0))},

(2.15)

where

and pj is the probability of having a child next period conditional on a household’s conception decision in the current period.
The interpretation is straightforward. A household without children makes fertility,
participation and consumption decisions simultaneously. If the households makes a conception decision this period, a child appears next period with probability pj . If wife does
not work, the household enjoys the value of her home production.
The value function for a household with a child of age d ∈ [1, 17] is given by:
V (x, d) = maxa′ {max{W (x, d), H(x, d)}},

(2.16)

W (x, d) = U (c, 1, 0) + βEV (x′ , d + 1),

(2.17)

where
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H(x, d) = U (c, 1, v) + βEV (x′ , d + 1).

(2.18)

A household with a child makes only participation and consumption decisions. If wife
works then the household has to pay the cost of child care pc G(d), which depends on the
age of the child d. If wife stays at home then the household enjoys the value of home
production v and does not have to pay the cost of child care.
The value function for a household after the child leaves is given by:

V (x, 18) = maxa′ {max{W (x, 18), H(x, 18)}},

(2.19)

W (x, 18) = U (c, 0, 0) + βEV (x′ , 18),

(2.20)

H(x, 18) = U (c, 0, v) + βEV (x′ , 18).

(2.21)

where

This household solves the same problem as a household without children ever born but
does not make a fertlity decision. Parents do not derive utility from a child after the child
leaves the household.
Denote household decision rules by a′ (x, d) for asset choice, f (x, d) for conception
decision and l(x, d) for wife’s labor participation decision. A solution to the household
problem is a set of decision rules, a′ (x, d), f (x, d) and l(x, d) such that given interest rate r,
a′ (x, 0), f (x, 0) and l(x, 0) solve equations (13)-(15) subject to the budget constraints (10)(12) for the household without children ever had, and a′ (x, d) and l(x, d) solve equations
(16)-(18) for the household with a child under age 18 and equations (19)-(21) for the
household after child leaves subject to the same budget constraints (10)-(12).
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2.4

Quantitative Analysis

In this section, I describe how I choose functional forms and the parameters for the benchmark model.

2.4.1

Calibration

Functional Forms
Utility function is separable, that is:
U (cj , nj , vj ; ej ) = log

cj
+ γnj + vj
ej

(2.22)

Following Hotz and Miller (1988), I specify the functional form for G as:
G(d) = φd−1 I(d ∈ [1, 17]).

(2.23)

Parameter φ allows to account for the difference in need for the child care for children
of different ages. The logarithm of husband’s human capital is assumed to be a cubic
polynomial in age:
log kjh = a0 + a1 j + a2 j 2 + a3 j 3 .

(2.24)

The probability of birth function pj is parametrized using a cubic polynomial:
pj = b0 + b1 j + b2 j 2 + b3 j 3 .

(2.25)

I assume that women are not fertile after age 44.
Parameters Set A Priori
Some of the model parameters can be independently determined. Their values are
described in Table 2.8. The model period is chosen to be one year. This is a reasonable
amount of time between the decision to have a child and the birth. In addition, this choice
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substantially reduces computing time. I assume that households enter the economy at
age 21 and leave the economy at age 65. To determine ej , I use McClements scale, which
depends on the age and number of children.10 The parameters for the earnings profile for
males are taken from Kambourov and Manovskii (2005) for the cohort of males entering
the labor market in 1968 at age 18. The earnings profile is normalized to 1 in the first
period at age 21. The initial value for the wife’s human capital process is chosen to match
the ratio of female and male median earnings at the beginning of their career.11 The
interest rate is set equal to 4%.
Table 2.8: Parameter Values Chosen A Priori.

Description

Values

Model Period

1 year

Age

J = 65, j1 = 21, d ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..18}

Equivalence Scale

McClements scale, ej = 1 for childless
couple, increases with age of child

Human Capital, Husband

a0 = 9.3224, a1 = 0.102,
a2 = −0.00322, a3 = 0.000029
Normalized to 1 at j1

Initial Human Capital, Wife

kjw1 /kjh1 = 0.805

Interest Rate

r = 0.04

Calibrated Parameters
Table 2.9 shows the set of parameters that I calibrate along with the description of
10

McClements scale assigns value 1 for a childless couple, 1.08 if a child is less than 2 years old and

values increasing with age of child. See McClements (1977) for details.
11
The value is computed using the CPS March 1971 data. The sample is restricted to include married
men and women who worked full time 50 weeks or more during the previous year, 18-19 years old with
high school degree and 21-22 years old with college degree.
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calibration targets. There are 15 parameters that are calibrated to match the same number
of the data statistics for 1970. It is clear that a change in each parameter leads to the
changes in all statistics so the mapping between the parameters and targets is intended to
show what parameters play a main role in determining respective statistics.
The calibrated model parameters are: utility of having a child, three coefficients for the
birth probability equation12 , persistence and standard deviation of aggregate shock, two
parameters governing human capital accumulation for females, price of child care, units of
child care function parameter, discount factor, borrowing limit and three parameters for
value of home production (persistence, standard deviation and mean locator).
The parameters are calibrated to match the following selected statistics:
1. The fertility rate for 22-25 years old married women, computed using the US 1970
census of population data as the ratio of number of first time births and number of women
between ages 22 and 25.
2. Shares of first time mothers for the following three age categories: 22-25, 26-30 and
31-35. These statistics are computed using the US 1970 census of population data and
rescaled to account for the fact that households enter the economy at age 21. The original
statistics are shown in Table 2.7 in the Facts section above.
3. Persistence and volatility of productivity, where productivity is output per worker
BLS series. The annual productivity series is detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with smoothing parameter 100.
4. The wage growth for two groups of women: younger than 34 years old and 34 years
old or older. Following Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008), these two statistics
are computed using PSID data for married women who have worked 90% of their lifetime
12

The fourth is set so that probability of birth next period equals to 0 for women of age 44 and older.
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at each age. The wage growth is measured as a parameter β1 in the following regression:
log yjw = β0 + β1 j + ǫj

(2.26)

5. Wealth to income ratio. The choice of this statistic is not straightforward since
the model considered in this work does not have many features that determine wealth
accumulation. In particular, there is no retirement and no health shock. The ratio of
household financial wealth (net worth excluding owners’ equity in household real estate)
to disposable personal income is 3.87 in 1970.13 I assume that the model has to account
for a third of that number and do a sensitivity analysis with respect to this choice.
6. Debt to income ratio. For the total debt to income ratio I use the ratio of consumer
debt outstanding to disposable personal income.14
The following statistics are computed using the US 1970 census of population data.
7. Employment rate for women with six year old child.15
8. Employment rate for women younger than 34 with infant, their first child.
9. Employment rate for women aged 34 or more with infant, their first child.
10. Employment rate for women younger than 34 without children under age 18.
11. Employment rate for women aged 34 or more without children under age 18.
Thus, there are fifteen targets to pin down fifteen parameters.

2.5
2.5.1

Results from the Calibrated Model
Benchmark Calibration

To find the parameter values the model is solved numerically according to the computational algorithm described in Appendix 2.8.2. Table 2.10 shows the performance of the
13

See Table B.100 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf.
See Table B.100 at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc hist r.html.
15
Employment rate is the proportion of married women who worked more than 30 hours during a reference

14

week.
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Table 2.9: Calibrated Parameters.

Parameters

Description

Calibration Targets

γ

Utility from a Child

Fertility Rate, Age 22-25

b1

Probability of Birth

Share of Births, Age 22-25

b2

Probability of Birth

Share of Births, Age 26-30

b3

Probability of Birth

Share of Births, Age 31-35

ρz , σ z

Shock

Volatility and Persistence
of Productivity

η0

Women’s HK

Wage Growth, Age 22-33

η1

Women’s HK

Wage Growth, Age 34-44

pc

Child Care Cost

Employment Rate,
Age 22-33, with Infant

φ

Child Care Function

Employment Rate, Women

Parameter

with 6 y.o. Child

β

Discount Factor

Wealth Income Ratio

amin

Borrowing Limit

Debt Income Ratio

σv2 , µv , ρv

Value of staying home

Employment Rate,
Age 34-44, with Infant
Employment Rate,
Age 22-33, no Children
Employment Rate,
Age 22-33, no Children

26

model in matching targets. We can see that the model matches the important features
of the data. Calibrated parameter values are shown in Table 2.11 and they are quite reasonable. For example, child care function parameter, φ, which determines how the need
for child care depends on the age of the child, equals to 0.901. Hotz and Miller (1988)
estimate the same parameter in their micro study and obtain the value 0.89. The price of
the unit of child care relative to women’s earnings is similar to that obtained by Attanasio,
Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008). Borrowing limit approximately equals to a household’s
period income at age 25 if wife has always worked, which is not unreasonable. The implied
probability of birth given a conception effort is about 0.4 at age 21 and decreases to zero
at age 44. The probability of conception is somewhat lower relative to natural fertility for
a modern sect practicing no birth control, which equals 0.55 for 20-24 years old women
(See Clark (2007)) but similar to the estimates reported in Hotz and Miller (1988) and
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985), who find a monthly conception probability of around 2.5%
on average during fertile years.16

2.5.2

Properties of the Model

The cyclical properties of the fertility rate, computed using the SIPP data and the simulated data from the calibrated model are shown in Table 2.12. We can see that the
benchmark model produces countercyclical fertility, driven by younger women. To understand the results, let us consider a new cohort of households entering the economy.
First, the utility from a child is high enough to guarantee that all agents want to have
a child. The question is about timing and it depends on the value of home production
and aggregate state of the economy. Recall that households draw a value of wife’s staying
home in the first period from a stochastic distribution. Women who have a high value
prefer to stay home and have a child early since they derive utility from having a child
16

Annual probability of conception equals 1 − (1 − 0.025)12 = 0.262
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Table 2.10: Benchmark Economy.

Statistic

Data

Model

Fertility Rate, Age 22-25

0.217

0.221

Employment Rate, with an Infant, Age 22-33

0.145

0.146

Employment Rate, with an Infant, Age 34-44

0.164

0.164

Employment Rate, no Children, Age 22-33

0.596

0.598

Employment Rate, no Children, Age 34-44

0.472

0.483

Share of Births, Age 22-25

0.621

0.601

Share of Births, Age 26-30

0.288

0.298

Share of Births, Age 31-35

0.060

0.059

Wage Growth, Age 22-33

0.026

0.026

Wage Growth, Age 34-44

0.013

0.013

Productivity, Standard Deviation

0.015

0.015

Productivity, Persistence

0.456

0.459

Wealth Income Ratio

1.290

1.295

Debt Income Ratio

0.178

0.174

Note: The table describes the performance of the model in matching the calibration targets.
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Table 2.11: Calibrated Parameter Values.

Parameter

Definition

Value

γ

Utility from a Child

0.308

b(1)

Probability of Birth Function

-0.001

b(2)

Probability of Birth Function

0.008

b(3)

Probability of Birth Function

-0.312

ρz

Persistence of Aggregate Shock

0.896

σz

Standard Deviation of Aggregate Shock

0.016

η0

Women’s Human Capital Accumulation

0.056

η1

Women’s Human Capital Accumulation

0.001

pc

Child Care Cost

0.573

φ

Child Care Function Parameter

0.901

β

Discount Factor

0.971

amin

Borrowing Limit

-2.128

σv2

Value of Staying Home, Standard Deviation

0.297

µv

Value of Staying Home, Mean Locator

0.446

ρv

Value of Staying Home, Persistence

0.476

Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the benchmark calibration.
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and do not pay child care costs if they stay home. Women at the margin between working
and staying home choose to give birth during a recession when the opportunity cost of
staying home is lower. Women who draw a low value of staying home face the following
trade off. On the one hand, they want to have a child early because of discounting. On
the other hand, the opportunity cost of staying home is high, so they choose to work in
the market and pay the cost of child care. The desire to smooth consumption is a force
to have a child later, when income is higher. These women prefer to have a child during
an expansion as a way to smooth household consumption. This intuition is clear if we
assume that the value of staying home is drawn randomly in the first period and stays
constant over the life-cycle. One undesirable implication of this assumption is that the
employment rate is close to zero for younger women with a young child and close to one
for older women with a young child. However, the employment rate varies little by age for
women with an infant as shown in Table 2.10. The introduction of persistent stochastic
process for the value of staying home allows to obtain the employment rate for women of
different ages with an infant as in the data and at the same time preserves the cyclical
properties of fertility. Another property of the model is that fertility is more important
as a tool to smooth consumption at an early age and assets are more important later in
life. This explains the much stronger cyclical response of fertility for younger households
compared to older households.

2.6

Experiments

In this section, I consider several changes in the determinants of female labor supply that
occurred between the two periods and have been proposed in the literature to explain the
increase in married women labor supply. I focus on the following candidates: 1) an increase
in wage level for females (implying a decrease in the gender wage gap), 2) an increase in
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Table 2.12: Data and Results from the Benchmark Model.

Statistic

Data

Model

βˆ1 (Age 22-44)

-0.024

-0.037

(s.e.)

(0.025)

βˆ1 (Age 22-25)

-0.116

(s.e.)

(0.049)

βˆ1 (Age 26-44)

0.023

(s.e.)

-0.130

0.002

(0.028)

Note: Estimates from the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives
a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t − 4, where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage
deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4.

the returns to experience for females and 3) a decrease in child care cost. It has been
argued that each of these changes is a major contributor to the changes in female labor
supply.17 The goal here is to evaluate the implication of each alternative for the cyclical
and secular properties of fertility in the model with endogenous fertility.
I also consider one more potential candidate that may have contributed to the rise in
female labor supply. As documented in Kambourov and Manovskii (2005) and shown in
Figure 2.3, a significant flattening of life-cycle earnings profiles for successive cohorts of
males occurred since the late 1960s. It is clear that this change in the earnings of their
husbands may induce women to increase their labor supply. Based on the properties of
the model described above, it may also lead to delay of fertility for women who are more
productive in the market relative to home. I want to evaluate these effects quantitatively.
The nature of the experiments is the following. I introduce changes in the determinants
17

See Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), Olivetti (2006), Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos

(2008) for candidates 1), 2) and 3) respectively.
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Figure 2.3: Life-Cycle Male Earnings Profile.
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of female labor supply that occurred between the two periods considered in this work,
compute the new steady state using the benchmark model with appropriate changes in
parameters and analyze the changes in female labor participation and properties of fertility
between the two steady states. To carry out the experiments, I need to quantify the changes
in the determinants of female labor supply and map them into changes in the parameters
of the benchmark model. For the change in females’ wage level experiment, I compute the
ratio of female and male median earnings when they enter the workforce for the first time
in 1990 using the CPS March 1991 data. Following the same way as in the benchmark
case, the sample is restricted to include married men and women who worked full time 50
weeks or more during the previous year, 18-19 years old with high school degree and 21-22
years old with college degree. The ratio changes from 0.805 in 1970 to 0.907 in 1990, an
increase by about 12.7%. For the flattening males’ life-cycle earnings profile experiment, I
use the parameters for the males earnings profile from Kambourov and Manovskii (2005)
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for the cohort of males entering the labor market in 1988 at age 18. As in the benchmark
case, the earnings profile is normalized to 1 in the first period at age 21. There is no
direct measure of historic child care price but Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008)
argue that a 15% decline is not unreasonable. I use this number and also 20% increase
in the marginal returns to experience for females averaged over the life-cycle used in their
work.18 This value is of the same order of magnitude as the estimate reported in Olivetti
(2006). Using the PSID data she finds a 25% increase in the elasticity of growth of hourly
wages with respect to hours of work for women between 1970s and 1990s. Since there is
empirical evidence of changes in all determinants of female labor supply considered in this
work, I consider all changes simultaneously, then one by one, and study the implications
for the cyclical and secular properties of fertility using the framework developed in this
work.
Experiment I. Changing All Determinants Proposed in the Literature Combined
In the first experiment, I introduce changes in all determinants proposed in the literature: 1) 12.7% increase in the initial females’ wage level (implying a decrease in the gender
wage gap), 2) 20% increase in the returns to experience for females and 3) 15% decrease
in the cost of child care. Table 2.13 shows the results. Combining all three alternatives together can account for the increase in participation of women without children, overshoots
the participation of mothers with an infant by about 23% for younger women and about
15% for older women and does not lead to a delay in fertility. The last result stems from
the fact that the increase in the females’ wage level and the returns to experience on the
one hand, and the decrease in child care costs on the other hand, balance each other out
as explained in the discussion of the Experiment II results below. Table 2.18 shows the
18

They consider increases by 10%, 20% and 40%.
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Table 2.13: Experiment I, Changing All Determinants Proposed in the Literature Combined, Exhibit A.

Statistic

Data

Data

Model

Period I

Period II

Period II

Fertility Rate, Age 22-25

0.217

0.154

0.227

Emp Rate w/ Infant, Age 22-33

0.145

0.368

0.451

Emp Rate w/ Infant, Age 34-44

0.164

0.405

0.461

Emp Rate, no Kids, Age 22-33

0.596

0.738

0.765

Emp Rate, no Kids, Age 34-44

0.472

0.664

0.662

Share of Births, Age 22-25

0.621

0.297

0.578

Share of Births, Age 26-30

0.288

0.438

0.321

Share of Births, Age 31-35

0.060

0.205

0.061

changes in the cyclicality of fertility as a result of the changes in all three determinants
combined. We can see that the fertility rate becomes procyclical as in the data but this
result is driven by the change in behavior of younger women, not older as in the data.
Experiment II, Changing Each Determinant Separately
To understand the role of each alternative, I carry out the set of experiments changing
the determinants of female labor supply one at a time. The results are shown in Table 2.15.
Column (W) shows the results of the increase in females’ wage level. In particular, I change
the ratio of female and male median earnings at the beginning of their career from 0.805 in
1970 to 0.907 in 1990. These statistics are computed using the CPS data as explained in the
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Table 2.14: Experiment I, Changing All Determinants Proposed in the Literature Combined, Exhibit B.

Statistic

Data

Data

Model

Period I

Period II

Period II

βˆ1 (Age 22-44)

-0.024

0.178

0.178

(s.e.)

(0.025)

(0.027)

βˆ1 (Age 22-25)

-0.116

-0.077

(s.e.)

(0.049)

(0.057)

0.023

0.266

(0.028)

(0.030)

βˆ1 (Age 26-44)
(s.e.)

0.730

0.065

Note: Estimates from the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives
a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t − 4, where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage
deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4.
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beginning of this section. The implied female-male earnings ratio increases from 0.597 to
0.697. These numbers are very close to the numbers estimated in Blau (1998), who reports
an increase from 0.562 in 1969 to 0.692 in 1989 for full-time workers between ages 25 and
64. Column (E) shows the results of the increase in the returns to experience for females.
More specifically, I increase η0 so that the implied marginal returns to experience averaged
over the life-cycle increase by 20%.19 Column (C) shows the results of the decrease in the
cost of child care, pc , by 15%. Finally, Column (M) shows the results of the flattening
males’ life-cycle earnings profile as estimated in Kambourov and Manovskii (2005). We
can see that the change in each determinant leads to the rise in the employment rate
for women but none of them can account for the increase entirely. The results of the
increase in females’ wage level and the returns to experience are similar, they produce
the increase in employment rate of younger and older women with an infant and without
children under age of 18. They also deliver a delay in fertility. The only difference is that,
not surprisingly, the increase in the returns to experience leads to a higher employment
rate for older women comparing to the increase in the wage level case. In the former case,
women accumulate more human capital at an early age and participate more when they
become older. Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) find similar results for the
gender wage gap experiment but they find that the increase in the returns to experience
has a small effect on women’s labor supply. They contribute this limited impact of the
returns to experience to the presence of uncertainty in their model as households work,
save more early in life and do not respond fully to intertemporal incentives. After careful
examination, the results of the decrease in child care costs experiment are similar to those
reported in Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) in terms of female labor force
participation. Participation of women without children remains unchanged, participation
19

Note that the marginal returns to experience depend on age.
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of women with young children increases by about the same percent, 26% for women under
age 29 and 36% for women above 29 in their work and 26% for younger women and 48%
for older women in this paper. The differences are that they consider changes between the
cohorts of women born in 1944-1948 and 1954-1958, consider women with children under
age of three and account for the change in participation rates from 0.42 to 0.53 for younger
women with children under age three and from 0.53 to 0.72 for older women with children
under age three. So the impact of the decrease in child care costs is very similar in two
models but it is not enough to account for the changes in the women’s labor participation
statistics used in this work. The decrease in the child care costs counterfactually predicts
that women begin childbearing earlier. The last experiment, flattening of males’ life-cycle
earnings profile, delivers the increase in employment rate for all categories of women but,
as in previous cases, not enough to account for the changes in the data. It also produces
a delay in fertility.
Before discussing the intuition behind the results of the experiments let us consider
their impact on the cyclical properties of the fertility rate. Table 2.16 shows the results.
Each alternative except flattening of males’ life-cycle earnings profile decreases the negative
correlation of fertility with the business cycle for all women and younger women but does
not change the correlation for older women.
To understand the economics behind the results of each experiment it is useful to recall
the mechanism behind the results of the benchmark model. Women who draw a high value
of staying home prefer to have a child as soon as they enter the economy and those at the
margin between working and staying home prefer to do it during a recession. Women who
draw a low value of staying home prefer to work in the market, have a child later when
household’s income is high enough and pay child care costs. They time their fertility to
good times to smooth household’s consumption.
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Table 2.15: Experiment II, Changing Each Determinant Separately, Exhibit A.

Statistic

Data I

Data II

(W)

(E)

(C)

(M)

Fertility Rate, 22-25

0.217

0.154

0.177

0.183

0.278

0.125

ER w/ Infant, 22-33

0.145

0.368

0.242

0.246

0.215

0.170

ER w/ Infant, 34-44

0.164

0.405

0.249

0.310

0.207

0.219

ER, no Kids, 22-33

0.596

0.738

0.675

0.682

0.593

0.678

ER, no Kids, 34-44

0.472

0.664

0.548

0.595

0.479

0.553

Share of Births, 22-25

0.621

0.297

0.509

0.510

0.686

0.407

Share of Births, 26-30

0.288

0.438

0.367

0.362

0.239

0.416

Share of Births, 31-35

0.060

0.205

0.075

0.077

0.045

0.107

Note: ER - Employment Rate. Columns Data I and Data II show the statistics from the data for Period I
and Period II respectively. Columns (W), (E), (C) and (M) show the statistics computed using the model
simulated series obtained increasing wage level for females, increasing the returns to experience for females,
decreasing child care costs and flattening life-cycle earnings profile for males respectively.
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Table 2.16: Experiment II, Changing Each Determinant Separately, Exhibit B.

Statistic

Data I

Data II

(W)

(E)

(C)

(M)

βˆ1 (Age 22-44)

-0.024

0.178

0.021

0.059

0.037

-0.143

(s.e.)

(0.025)

(0.027)

βˆ1 (Age 22-25)

-0.116

-0.077

0.050

0.009

0.060

-0.754

(s.e.)

(0.049)

(0.057)

0.023

0.266

-0.001

0.048

-0.013

-0.033

(0.028)

(0.030)

βˆ1 (Age 26-44)
(s.e.)

Note: Estimates from the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives
a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t − 4, where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage
deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4. Columns Data I and Data II show the statistics
from the data for Period I and Period II respectively. Columns (W), (E), (C) and (M) show the statistics
computed using the model simulated series obtained increasing the wage level for females, increasing the
returns to experience for females, decreasing child care costs and flattening life-cycle earnings profile for
males respectively.
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To understand how the experiments work we need to consider how those two groups
of households are affected. The intuition behind the increase in females’ wage level and
returns to experience experiments is similar. Higher current or expected future wage level
decreases the threshold value of staying home and induces more women to work in the
market compared to the benchmark case. These women delay their fertility and the fertility
rate declines for younger women. Women with low value of staying home prefer to have
a child earlier because the household’s income is higher. The effect for the former group
dominates and there is a delay in fertility as a result. Since the market wage increases
while the value of staying home and child care costs remain unchanged, the employment
rate is higher for younger and older women with and without children. The correlation
of fertility with the business cycle increases for younger women and overall, because of
the change in behavior of women with low value of staying home. The number of women
with high value of staying home who prefer to have a child during a recession stays about
the same while the number of women who prefer to work in the market and pay child
care costs when they give a birth increases.20 At the same time, women with low value
of staying home prefer to have a child earlier compared to the benchmark case because
household income is higher.
The decrease in the child care costs case is different from the experiments described
above because women with high value home production stay home when they have a child,
do not pay child care costs and therefore, they are not affected. Women with low value of
staying home have a child earlier compared to the benchmark case and childbearing shifts
to earlier ages as a result, the opposite to what we see in the data. The employment rate
of women without children is not affected while it increases for women with a child as in
20

The change in the number of women in the former case depends on the change in the mass of agents

around the threshold value of home production and it is relatively small because the threshold is located
around the median.
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the wage level and returns to experience cases. As women with low value of staying home
start bearing a child earlier and the employment rate increases for women with a child,
the correlation of fertility with the business cycle increases for all and younger households.
The flattening of males’ life-cycle earnings profile operates in the following way. As
their husbands’ income decreases more women work in all categories compared to the
benchmark case. The impact on women with high value of staying home is the same as
in the wage level and returns to experience experiments. The threshold value of staying
home decreases, more women work and delay their fertility. The impact on women with
low value of staying home is unique for this experiment. The decline in household income
leads to a delay in fertility for these women since they wait longer till the household income
is high enough. Both groups of women delay fertility, that is why the delay in fertility
is the most pronounced among all experiments. The delay in fertility by the group with
low value of staying home is the reason that fertility becomes stronger countercyclical and
that this is driven by younger women. As women with low value of staying home, whose
fertility response to aggregate shock is procyclical, delay the birth of their child and fertility
becomes less important as a tool to smooth consumption, the countercyclical response of
younger mothers becomes more pronounced and dominates the overall response.
Experiment III. Changing All Four Determinants Combined
In experiment III, I introduce the changes in all four determinants: 1) 12.7% increase
in wage level for females (implying a decrease in the gender wage gap), 2) 20% increase in
the returns to experience for females, 3) 15% decrease in child care costs and 4) flattening
males’ life-cycle earnings profile. Column (L) in Table 2.17 shows the results from experiment I (changes 1), 2) and 3) combined) and Column (L+M) shows the results obtained
changing all four determinants. All changes combined lead to the higher employment rates
for all categories of women in the second period comparing to the data. The employment
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Table 2.17: Experiment III, Changing All Four Determinants Combined, Exhibit A.

Statistic

Data I

Data II

(L)

(L+M)

Fertility Rate, Age 22-25

0.217

0.154

0.227

0.169

Emp Rate w/ Infant, Age 22-33

0.145

0.368

0.451

0.495

Emp Rate w/ Infant, Age 34-44

0.164

0.405

0.461

0.546

Emp Rate, no Kids, Age 22-33

0.596

0.738

0.765

0.790

Emp Rate, no Kids, Age 34-44

0.472

0.664

0.662

0.730

Share of Births, Age 22-25

0.621

0.297

0.578

0.446

Share of Births, Age 26-30

0.288

0.438

0.321

0.415

Share of Births, Age 31-35

0.060

0.205

0.061

0.084

Note: Columns Data I and Data II show the statistics from the data for Period I and Period II respectively.
Columns (L) and (L+M) show the statistics computed using the model simulated series obtained changing
all three determinants proposed in the literature and all four determinants respectively.

rate increases by 35% higher for women with an infant and by about 7 − 10% higher
for women without children comparing to the data. Adding flattening of the life-cycle
earning profile generates a delay in fertility as observed in the data. The fertility rate
declines for the youngest households and women have their first child later comparing to
the benchmark case.
Table 2.18 shows the changes in the cyclical properties of fertility. Combined with
other alternatives, the flattening of the life-cycle earnings profile for males dampens the
strong procyclical fertility for younger women, though it is not enough to generate the
change in the cyclical properties of fertility observed in the data.
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Table 2.18: Experiment III, Changing All Four Determinants Combined, Exhibit B.

Statistic

Data I

Data II

(L)

(L+M)

βˆ1 (Age 22-44)

-0.024

0.178

0.179

0.118

(s.e.)

(0.025)

(0.027)

βˆ1 (Age 22-25)

-0.116

-0.077

0.730

0.614

(s.e.)

(0.049)

(0.057)

0.023

0.266

0.065

0.084

(0.028)

(0.030)

βˆ1 (Age 26-44)
(s.e.)

Note: Estimates from the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives
a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t − 4, where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage
deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4. Columns Data I and Data II show the statistics from
the data for Period I and Period II respectively. Columns (L) and (L+M) show the statistics computed
using the model simulated series obtained changing all three determinants proposed in the literature and
all four determinants respectively.
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2.7

Conclusion

I document and analyze the change in the cyclical behavior of the fertility rate at business
cycle frequencies. I find that fertility is countercyclical in the 1960s and 1970s and procyclical thereafter. Countercyclical fertility is shaped by the behavior of younger women
in the first period and the change in the second period is driven by the change in the
behavior of older women. I find that a standard model with incomplete markets can generate countercyclical fertility in the 1960s and 1970s. The model implies that properties of
fertility are related to labor force participation decisions of married women. The following
candidates have been suggested in the literature to explain the rise in married women’s
labor supply between the 1970s and 1990s:
1. A decrease in the gender wage gap.
2. An increase in the returns to experience for females.
3. A decrease in child care costs.
These changes have implications for the properties of fertility. The decrease in the
gender wage gap and the increase in the returns to experience lead to fertility delay while
the decrease in child care costs shifts childbearing to earlier ages contrary to the data. Each
alternative decreases the negative correlation of fertility with the business cycle for younger
women and overall but does not change the correlation for older women. Combining all
three alternatives together does not change the age of women at first birth and leads to
overall procyclical fertility as observed in the data, but driven by younger women, not
older.
The flattening of life-cycle earnings profile for males leads to a delay in fertility and
stronger countercyclical fertility, driven by younger women. Combining it with other
candidates dampens the strong procyclical fertility for younger women, though it is not
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enough to generate the change in the cyclical properties of fertility observed in the data.
The key message of this work is that female labor force participation and timing of
fertility are determined by the same economic forces, and implications for fertility can
be used to distinguish among theories of the rise in labor force participation of married
women. The question that remains open is what drives the strong procyclical fertility for
older women in the second period.
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2.8
2.8.1

Appendix
Data

Output. Output is business output series constructed by BLS.21
Productivity. Productivity is business output per worker constructed by BLS.
Unemployment Rate. Unemployment rate is civilian unemployment rate computed
using the Current Population Surveys (CPS) data.
Employment Rates, Birth Shares. Women’s employment rates and birth shares for
first time mothers in 1970 and 1990 are computed using the US census of population data
available at http://usa.ipums.org/usa/.
Gender Wage Gap. Gender wage gap for individuals entering the labor market is computed as explained in the paper using the Current Population Survey March Supplement
data available at http://cps.ipums.org/cps/.
Wage Growth. Females wage growth rates are computed as explained in the paper using
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data available at http://simba.isr.umich.edu/.
Fertility Rate. The seasonally adjusted monthly fertility rate is taken from National
Vital Statistics Reports for the years 1998-2007
(available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/nvsr.htm), Monthly Vital Statistics Reports for the years 1970-1997
(available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/mvsr.htm#vol12s) and U.S. U.S. Census
(1939-2002) Vital Statistics for the years 1951-1969. Monthly series is averaged into quarterly series.
21

BLS data are available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?pr.
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SIPP data. SIPP 1984 and 2001 Panels are formed from nationally representative samples of individuals of 15 years of age and older of the civilian noninstitutionalized population. Information is collected about sampled individuals and their household members.
1984 Panel began interviews in October 1983 with sample members in 19,878 households.
The interviews were conducted once every four months over a 32-month period. 2001
Panel began interviews in February 2001 with sample members in 36,700 households. The
interviews were conducted once every four months over a 36-month period. The Panel
was divided into four rotation groups. Each rotation group was interviewed in a separate month. An interview wave is a set of interviews covering all four rotation groups
during four months. Respondents were asked questions about the previous four months
during each interview. A core set of questions was repeated at each wave of interviewing.
Some sets of questions, labeled ‘Topical Modules’, were assigned to particular interviewing
waves. These modules were designed to obtain the detailed information about a variety of
topics including marital and fertility history. Marital history contains information about
the first, the second and the last marriages for individuals ever married. Fertility history
contains information about the first and the last child for women who had children. In
particular, the 1984 Panel includes a month and a year of the beginning of each marriage,
divorce and separation and a month and a year of birth of the first and the last child. The
2001 Panel includes only a year of all aforementioned events.
To construct the fertility histories for women in 1984 and 2001 Panels, I identify all
individuals of age 18 and below at time of an interview and locate their mothers using the
person number of parent variable, P N P T 22 , from 1984 Panel and the person number of
mother variable, EP N M U M , from 2001 Panel. I use variable ET Y P M OM to consider
only biological children of women in 2001 Panel. Panel 1984 does not have this information.
22

This variable identifies mother if she lives in the same household.
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Since the majority of mothers are biological mothers for children who live with mothers
in their households, the results will not be affected most likely23 . Since a month and a
year of birth are available for all individuals in the data; for a given women, I obtain the
dates of births of her children who live in the same household. I link core files and topical
modules files24 and construct women’s marital histories using the topical module data.
The resulting 1984 sample contains about 10, 000 women. The total number of births is
about 400 on average every year during the 1960s and 1970s. The number of first births
is about 160 on average every year during the same time. The resulting 2001 sample
contains about 21, 000 women. The total number of births is about 900 on average every
year during 1980s and 1990s. The number of first births is about 400 on average every
year during the same period.

2.8.2

Numerical Solution and Algorithm

Since agents face a finite horizon, the numerical solution of the model is obtained recursively starting from the terminal period. Given the household’s state vector and the value
function for the next period, the current value function and decision rules are solved for.
j
A state vector, x := (z, j, kw
, v j , a, 0), consists of six variables: aggregate shock, age, wife’s

human capital, wife’s value of staying home, asset stock and age of child. Given a state
vector, a household that never had children (d = 0) makes a labor participation decision
for the wife, a fertility decision and an asset accumulation decision according to Bellman
equations (13)-(15) and subject to the budget constraints (10)-(12). A household with
a child (d ∈ [1, 17]) makes a labor participation decision for a wife and asset accumulation decision according to Bellman equations (16)-(18) and subject to the same budget
23

For example, the likelihood that a child lives with his or her biological mother given that this child

has a mother in a household is above 97% based on 2001 Panel data.
24
See http://www.census.gov/sipp/linking.html for details about using and linking files.
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constraints (10)-(12). A household after leaving of the child (d > 17), makes a labor
participation decision for a wife and asset accumulation decision according to Bellman
equations (19)-(21) and subject to the same budget constraints (10)-(12).
The combination of the discrete and continuous choices implies that the value functions
are not necessarily concave or differentiable. The problem arises because of participation
and fertility decisions in future periods. As asset level increases, consumption can decrease
because of the changes in the future labor force status or presence of child. Therefore, I
discretize continuous state variables and solve for an approximate solution of the household
problem.
There are four continuous state variables: the aggregate shock, wife’s human capital,
the value of staying home and the asset stock. The state space of the problem is the subset
of R6 space: (R+ × {j1 , .., J} × R+ × R × [amin , ∞] × {0, .., 18}). Continuous stochastic
processes for aggregate shock, z, and value of staying home, v, are approximated by discrete
processes with 7 and 15 states respectively using Tauchen (1986) algorithm. Given the
initial value of wife’s human capital, the maximum value is computed assuming she never
stays home during her life and a nonlinear grid with 30 points is employed with points
concentrated near the initial value. The upper bound for asset stock of 22 is chosen so
that it never binds and a nonlinear grid with 40 points is used with points concentrated
near the borrowing limit and zero. As a result, the discretized state space has the size
(7 × 45 × 30 × 15 × 40 × 19). To reduce the approximation error, I solve for optimal asset
decision rule, a′ , in two steps. In the first step, given a current state, I find an optimal a′
among the grid points, in the second step, I use a golden search method to find an optimal
a′ around the point obtained in the first step and do a sensitivity analysis with respect to
this procedure. I use a weighted linear approximation of expected continuation value to
obtain its value at a point outside of the set of grid points for the asset stock and wife’s
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human capital state variables.
I employ the simulated method of moments (SMM) to find the parameter values that
produce the target statistics. The following algorithm is used to find a solution of household
problem. First, guess values are assigned to the calibrated parameters summarized in Table
2.9. Using these parameters as well as parameters set a priori, optimal decisions rules
for asset holding, labor participation and fertility are obtained employing finite dynamic
program. In the next step, I simulate the aggregate shock history for 4, 000 periods. Every
period, a value of staying home is drawn from a stationary distribution for 5, 000 households
entering the economy and simulated for the rest of the households25 . Using the simulated
values and optimal decision rules, the target statistics and the value of the SMM objective
function are calculated for the model economy. The procedure that I use to minimize
the objective function is Downhill Simplex. Since this is a local optimization procedure
I use different initial parameter values and Simulated Annealing global routine to make
sure that the optimal parameter values represent a unique solution of the optimization
problem.

2.8.3

Sensitivity Analysis

Alternative Business Cycle Indicators and 1st Order Fertility Rate
Table 2.19 shows the correlation of the fertility rate with several business cycle indicators,
in particular productivity, output and unemployment rate. We can see that all in all the
results are not sensitive to the choice of the business cycle indicator. It is not clear a priori
what indicator is more appropriate to measure the cyclicality of fertility rate since it is
not known what information households use to form expectations about the state of the
economy. The results are reasonable in terms of the lag structure since productivity leads
output by about two quarters and unemployment rate is sluggish. I use the band pass filter
25

There are 5, 000 households of each age from 21 to 65 in any given period in the economy.
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(Baxter and King (1999)) rather than Hodrick-Prescott filter to isolate frequencies that
are relevant for business cycle analysis, because the former removes the high frequency
fluctuations from the fertility rate series.
Since a household can have only one child in the model, in Table 2.20 I report the
correlation of the 1st order fertility rate with the business cycle indicators. The results
are virtually unchanged compared the overall fertility rate case.
At the micro level, Table 2.21 shows the results for the first births using the SIPP data.
We can see that the results are very similar to the results for all births shown in Table 2.5.
Countercyclical fertility in the first period is driven by younger women while procyclical
fertility in the second period is driven by older women.
Since the proportion of educated women has increased substantially during the period of study (See Panels A and B in Table 2.2), it is possible that women with different
educational achievements behave in a different way and the changes in the cyclical properties of fertility are driven by the composition effect. Table 2.22 shows that this is not
the case since women with different level of education experienced similar changes as all
women. Table 2.23 shows the results for the first births by education. Again, the results
are qualitatively the same as for all births.
Benchmark Model Assumptions
Here, I discuss the sensitivity of the results to the choice of two target statistics: wealth to
income ratio and debt to income ratio. Discount factor, β, and borrowing limit, amin , are
the most important parameters determining wealth to income and debt to income ratios in
the model. Instead of changing the target statistics and recalibrating the model, I change
β and amin and analyze the impact on the results of the benchmark model. One more
important issue to consider is the assumption about the price of the child care unit, pc .
I assume that it is constant but it may be argued that pc may change over the business
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cycle since child care expenditures are used to pay wages of those who provide child care
services and if wages are procyclical than so should be the price of child care. There is no
direct evidence about the behavior of the price of child care over the business cycle so I
do a sensitivity analysis assuming that elasticity of pc with respect to wage equals one.
Tables 2.24 shows the sensitivity of the benchmark model results to the changes in β,
amin and child care price elasticity. Column (B) shows the results of the benchmark model.
Columns (1) and (2) show the results of setting β = 0.965 and β = 0.975 respectively.
We can see that households have a child earlier and the fertility rate becomes less countercyclical as a result of the decrease in β. This happens because women with low value
of staying home want to have a child earlier. The increase in β has the opposite effect.
The effect on employment rate is very small. Columns (3), (4) and (5) show the results of
setting amin = −2.5, amin = −1.5 and amin = 0.0 respectively. Employment and fertility
rates are not affected significantly. As expected, increasing the borrowing limit leads to
stronger countercyclical fertility rate as households can smooth consumption better and
decreasing the borrowing limit leads to the opposite effect. It is clear that the fertility
rate will be strongly countercyclical in the case of the “natural” borrowing constraint26 .
In case of no borrowing (amin = 0.0), the fertility rate becomes procyclical. Column (6)
shows the results setting elasticity of child care price with respect to wage equal to one.
The only significant change is that the fertility rate becomes stronger countercyclical.
This analysis shows that the results are not sensitive to small changes in β and amin ,
which means that they are not sensitive to small changes in wealth to income and debt
to income ratios. Introduction of the procyclical child care price leads to a stronger
countercyclical fertility rate. In this case, setting the borrowing limit to zero or decreasing
26

The “natural” borrowing constraint arises if the utility function satisfies the Inada condition and

households never choose an asset position such that they may end up with zero consumption in some
future state with positive probability.
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the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and recalibrating the parameters brings the
results of the benchmark model and experiments back. Changing σ, I essentially target
the cyclicality of fertility rate. Once I get the cyclicality of fertility rate as in the benchmark
model, the results of the experiments still hold.
Table 2.19: Correlation of Fertility Rate and Business Cycle Indicators.

Lag

Productivity

Output

Unemployment

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

Current

-0.429*

0.145

-0.619*

0.399*

0.607*

-0.492*

1 Quarter

-0.489*

0.259*

-0.576*

0.485*

0.458*

-0.559*

2 Quarters

-0.492*

0.382*

-0.487*

0.526*

0.274*

-0.539*

3 Quarters

-0.449*

0.475*

-0.378*

0.502*

0.093

-0.438*

4 Quarters

-0.375*

0.500*

-0.273*

0.401*

-0.049

-0.281*

5 Quarters

-0.294*

0.436*

-0.189**

0.231*

-0.139

-0.097

6 Quarters

-0.226*

0.294*

-0.129

0.009

-0.180

0.095

Source: Fertility rate - National Center for Health Statistics. Output and productivity - BLS.
Note: Fertility rate is the number of births per 1000 women between the ages of 15 to 44. Output is
business output, Productivity is business output per worker. Unemployment rate is civilian unemployment
rate. All variables are detrended using band pass filter with frequency parameters 6 and 32 for quarterly
data. Single ‘*’ and double ‘**’ indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant with 5% and 10%
level of significance.
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Table 2.20: Correlation of 1st Order Fertility Rate and Business Cycle Indicators.

Lag

Productivity

Output

Unemployment

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

Current

-0.509*

-0.091

-0.584*

0.334*

0.530*

-0.575*

1 Quarter

-0.531*

0.082

-0.476*

0.477*

0.372*

-0.674*

2 Quarters

-0.503*

0.284*

-0.330*

0.579*

0.077

-0.674*

3 Quarters

-0.427*

0.461*

-0.178

0.607*

-0.138

-0.578*

4 Quarters

-0.314*

0.558*

-0.044

0.543*

-0.288*

-0.414*

5 Quarters

-0.183

0.545*

0.056

0.386*

-0.359*

-0.213*

6 Quarters

-0.060

0.428

0.119

0.163

-0.366*

-0.002

Source: Fertility rate - National Center for Health Statistics. Output and productivity - BLS.
Note: 1st order fertility rate is the number of first time births per 1000 women between the ages of 15 to
44. Output is business output, Productivity is business output per person. Unemployment rate is BLS
civilian unemployment rate. All variables are detrended using band pass filter with frequency parameters 6
and 32 for quarterly data. Single ‘*’ and double ‘**’ indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant
with 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
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Table 2.21: Probability of Birth over the Business Cycle, 1st Order Births, SIPP data.

Period I

Period II

1966-1981

1984-2003

Age Group

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

Age 22-44

-0.013 (0.017)

0.129 (0.017)

Age 22-25

-0.034 (0.035)

0.028 (0.041)

Age 26-44

0.019 (0.016)

0.130 (0.019)

Age 15-44

-0.019 (0.015)

0.094 (0.017)

Age 15-25

-0.039 (0.024)

-0.058 (0.032)

Note: Estimates the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives a first
birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in period
t − 4.
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Table 2.22: Probability of Birth over the Business Cycle, by Education, SIPP data.

Low Skilled

High Skilled

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

1966-1981

1984-2003

1966-1981

1984-2003

Age Group

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

Age 22-44

-0.004 (0.031)

0.232 (0.043)

-0.059 (0.041)

0.145 (0.034)

Age 22-25

-0.127 (0.065)

0.025 (0.101)

-0.101 (0.073)

-0.112 (0.067)

Age 26-44

0.055 (0.034)

0.223 (0.046)

-0.034 (0.050)

0.226 (0.040)

Age 15-44

-0.024 (0.027)

0.163 (0.040)

-0.047 (0.033)

0.050 (0.030)

Age 15-25

-0.105 (0.041)

-0.082 (0.068)

-0.055 (0.043)

-0.167 (0.048)

Note: Estimates the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives a birth
in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in period
t − 4. Low skilled category includes women with high school degree or lower education attainment at time
of interview. High skilled category includes women with some college or higher education attainment.
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Table 2.23: Probability of Birth over the Business Cycle, 1st Order Births, by Education,
SIPP data.

Low Skilled

High Skilled

Period I

Period II

Period I

Period II

1966-1981

1984-2003

1966-1981

1984-2003

Age Group

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

βˆ1 (s.e.)

Age 22-44

0.019 (0.019)

0.113 (0.026)

-0.029 (0.029)

0.126 (0.023)

Age 22-25

-0.026 (0.044)

0.079 (0.066)

-0.046 (0.059)

-0.004 (0.052)

Age 26-44

0.041 (0.018)

0.104 (0.026)

-0.020 (0.031)

0.143 (0.026)

Age 15-44

-0.001 (0.018)

0.116 (0.026)

-0.021 (0.024)

0.080 (0.022)

Age 15-25

-0.048 (0.031)

-0.012 (0.051)

-0.023 (0.035)

-0.073 (0.040)

Note: Estimates the linear probability model bit = β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives a
first birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in
period t−4. Low skilled category includes women with high school degree or lower education attainment at
time of interview. High skilled category includes women with some college or higher education attainment.
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Table 2.24: Benchmark Economy: Sensitivity Analysis.

Statistic

(B)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Fertility Rate, Age 22-25

0.221

0.278

0.151

0.232

0.211

0.197

0.235

ER w/ Infant, Age 22-33

0.146

0.144

0.159

0.153

0.162

0.166

0.160

ER, w/ Infant, Age 34-44

0.164

0.156

0.176

0.163

0.164

0.163

0.163

ER, no Children, Age 22-33

0.598

0.564

0.654

0.588

0.615

0.636

0.599

ER, no Children, Age 34-44

0.483

0.460

0.501

0.484

0.483

0.484

0.483

Share of Births, Age 22-25

0.601

0.676

0.418

0.619

0.589

0.504

0.613

Share of Births, Age 26-30

0.298

0.242

0.414

0.283

0.305

0.369

0.288

Share of Births, Age 31-35

0.059

0.048

0.099

0.058

0.062

0.075

0.059

Wage Growth, Age 22-33

0.026

0.026

0.026

0.026

0.026

0.026

0.026

Wage Growth, Age 34-44

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.013

0.013

Productivity, Std Deviation

0.015

0.015

0.015

0.015

0.015

0.015

0.015

Productivity, Persistence

0.459

0.447

0.469

0.464

0.471

0.474

0.455

βˆ1 (Age 22-44)

-0.037

0.041

-0.196

-0.052

-0.021

0.185

-0.057

βˆ1 (Age 22-25)

-0.130

0.074

-0.914

-0.276

-0.040

1.015

-0.464

βˆ1 (Age 26-44)

0.002

0.015

-0.063

-0.022

-0.009

0.051

0.011

Debt Income Ratio

0.174

0.278

0.051

0.221

0.133

0.000

0.177

Wealth Income Ratio

1.295

0.672

2.247

1.125

1.322

1.602

1.284

Note: ER - Employment rate, βˆ1 is obtained estimating the following linear probability model: bit =
β0 + β1 dt−4 + ǫit , where bit = 1 if woman i gives a first birth in period t and bit = 0 otherwise, dt−4 is
the percentage deviation of productivity from trend in period t − 4. Column (B) shows the results of the
benchmark model (β = 0.97, amin = −2), column (1): β = 0.965, column (2): β = 0.975, column (3):
amin = −2.5, column (4): amin = −1.5, column (5): amin = 0, column (6): procyclical child care price.
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Chapter 3

Taxation and Unemployment
3.1

Introduction

The facts describing the secular evolution of unemployment and taxes in the U.S. and
continental Europe are well known. In the 1960s unemployment rates were quite similar
in the U.S. and in the continental European countries. While the unemployment rate in
the U.S. has remained at almost the same level until now, the rates in many European
countries have increased starting in the late 1970s and stayed considerably higher than in
the U.S. since then. At the same time the tax wedge, measured as the sum of labor and
sales taxes, has increased in those European countries relative to the U.S.
A natural framework to understand the relationship between taxes and unemployment
is the leading theory of equilibrium unemployment, the Mortensen and Pissarides (MP)
search and matching model. However, this simple framework has an important limitation
for studying the effects of policies, such as taxation. Productivity is assumed to be exogenous so that it does not respond to changes in tax rates. This seems restrictive both from
an empirical and a theoretical perspective. Empirically, Prescott (2004), among others,
documents that the increase in tax rates was accompanied by an increase in aggregate
productivity (most notably in France and Germany) relative to productivity in the U.S.
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Furthermore, we document that the skill premium, the relative productivity of college and
high school graduates, is strongly negatively related to the tax wedge.
Theory also suggests that large differences in policy do not leave productivity and
technology unaffected. The literature on induced technical change, pioneered by Acemoglu (2002, 2007) predicts a non-neutral shift in productivity in response to the change
in relative abundance of productive inputs. If, for example, unemployed low-skilled labor
becomes more abundant due to a change in the tax policy, technologies that are biased
toward low-skilled labor and thus increase its productivity are more likely to be developed
in the long run. In the theory developed in Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante
(2000), changes in productivity are due to a technology which features capital-skill complementarity. The adjustment of the stocks of capital as well as of high- and low-skilled
labor in response to a change in policy lead to an endogenous change in productivity. This
theory is a natural candidate to conduct a quantitative analysis with because changes in
productivity can be accounted for by changes in observed factor quantities, most notably
the stock of capital equipment. Thus, building on the standard MP setup we allow for
ex-ante heterogeneity in skills (high-skilled and low-skilled workers) that interact on the
production side of the economy as in Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000).
The endogenous response of productivity in our model has several important implications. First, in the standard MP model, a one percentage point permanent decrease in
productivity and a one percentage point permanent increase in sales taxes increase unemployment by the same amount. The finding that these two responses are very close is
not a coincidence but a feature of many models driven by productivity, including the MP
model. However, the data suggest that the elasticity with respect to productivity necessary to replicate business cycles is considerably larger than the elasticity with respect to
taxes required to explain cross-country differences (Costain and Reiter (2008), Mortensen
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and Nagypal (2005), Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005b)).1 Our framework can resolve this dilemma. The endogenous response of productivity mitigates the policy response
substantially without sacrificing the business cycle properties.
Second, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005a) have pointed out that the MP model
has the counterfactual implication that the rise in unemployment in response to, e.g., skillbiased technical change is concentrated among the low-skilled workers2 , whereas Nickell
and Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), among others, conclude that data
from many European countries support the conclusion that unemployment rose proportionately across the entire skill spectrum. We show that the change in productivities in
our model induced by an increase in the tax wedge shifts the rise in unemployment toward
high skilled workers.
We calibrate the model following the strategy of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and
find that the two-skill version of the MP model is consistent with the cyclical volatility of
the aggregate and group-specific labor market variables in the data. The model generates
a high unemployment volatility among low-skilled workers because their productivity in
the market is estimated to be relatively close to their productivity at home. The model
also matches a high volatility of unemployment among high skilled workers despite the fact
that their estimated value of non-market activity is substantially lower than their market
productivity.3
To understand the cyclical behavior of labor market variables for different groups
1

For example, the MP model calibrated in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) generates the observed

amount of volatility of unemployment and vacancies but generates very large policy effects.
2
See, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) for alternative
models that share this prediction.
3
This is consistent with the common prior articulated in e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) who argue
that it is a “plausible assumption that the economic value of non-employment (other than UI benefits)
does not increase proportionately with skill.” Moreover, they argue that the same is true of the UI benefits
which are closer to the productivity level of less skilled workers.
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of workers it is essential to identify the cyclical behavior of their productivities.4 The
aggregate production function estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante
(2000) provides the way to do so. This production function accounts exceptionally well
for the trends in wages of skilled and unskilled workers over the last several decades. It
thus appears to be a natural candidate to provide an accurate and parsimonious way
to also measure the business-cycle properties of the marginal productivities of the two
labor inputs it considers: high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Measuring the evolution
of worker productivity using this production function, we find that the (endogenously
determined) marginal product of high-skilled workers is considerably more volatile over the
business cycle than the marginal product of low-skilled workers. One important reason
for this finding is that Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) estimate that
high-skilled workers and capital equipment are complements in the production process.
Since investment-specific shocks are an important contributor to business cycle fluctuations
(Fisher (2006)), they amplify the volatility of productivity of high-skilled workers. This
explains why the cyclical volatility of unemployment is high for high-skilled workers despite
them having a relatively low value of non-market activities.
The paper is organized as follows. A discrete time stochastic version of the Pissarides
(1985, 2000) search and matching model with two skill groups and capital-skill complementarity is laid out in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we develop our calibration strategy.
In Section 3.4 we describe the quantitative behavior of the model over the business cycle,
both in the aggregate and for both groups of workers. We find that the model matches the
cyclical volatility of labor market variables very well. A comparison with the results from
4

We cannot use wages to infer the cyclical behavior of productivity because wages are not equal to the

marginal product of labor in a search model. In most parameterizations of the MP model, including the
one in this paper, the level of wages is very close to average productivity. The cyclical properties of wages,
however, are different from the cyclical properties of productivity.
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the homogeneous worker model (with exogenous productivity) implies that the model with
worker heterogeneity generates higher volatility of aggregate labor market statistics and
is closer to the data than the homogeneous worker model.
Having verified that the model is a good quantitative laboratory, we conduct the analysis of policy effects in Section 3.5. The analysis is subdivided in two parts. First, we
analyze the effects of policies theoretically to better understand how the model works and
what features of the model are important for dampening the effects of policies. One important result is that introducing curvature in the production side of the MP model is not
sufficient per se to dampen the effects of policies. It is only if the production function includes heterogeneous and imperfectly substitutable labor inputs that the effects of policies
will be dampened relative to the effects of cyclical movements in productivity. Next, we
use the calibrated model to evaluate the effects of policies quantitatively. We find that the
effects of policies are dampened substantially compared to the homogeneous agent version
of the model, and are in line with the effects of policies implied by the data. Moreover,
consistent with the U.S. and European experiences, higher taxes increase the productivity
of low skilled workers and (slightly) decreases the productivity of high skilled workers,
so that aggregate productivity increases and the skill premium decreases. The relative
change in productivities also shifts the rise in unemployment toward high skilled workers.
Since the productivity of low skilled workers increases in equilibrium, firms incentives to
post vacancies for low skilled workers increases and thus lowers their unemployment rate
whereas for high skilled workers the opposite holds. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2

The Model

We consider a stochastic discrete time version of the Pissarides (1985, 2000) search and
matching model with aggregate uncertainty and workers of two types T ∈ {L, H}, referring

63

to low- and high-skilled workers, respectively.

3.2.1

Workers and Firms

There are measures N T of infinitely lived workers of each type and a continuum of infinitely
lived firms. Workers maximize their expected lifetime utility:
E

∞
X

δ t ytT ,

(3.1)

t=0

where ytT represents income in period t and δ ∈ (0, 1) is workers’ and firms’ common
discount factor.
There is a competitive final goods sector that combines 4 inputs to produce the final
good - low-skilled labor lt , high-skilled labor ht , capital structures kst and capital equipment ket - through the following production function (Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and
Violante (2000)):
h
 σ i 1−α
σ
ρ
α
,
yt = F (lt , ht , kst , ket ) = At kst
µltσ + (1 − µ) λket
+ (1 − λ)hρt ρ

(3.2)

where At is a neutral technology shock.
The resource constraint is
F (t) = Ct + ist +

iet
,
qt

(3.3)

where ist is investment in capital structures, iet is investment in capital equipment, Ct is
consumption, and where the technology parameter qt determines the amount of equipment
that can be produced by one unit of final output. In a perfectly competitive market, qt
is also the relative price between consumption and equipment, a feature we exploit to
measure q in the calibration (as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and Krusell,
Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000)). The two stocks of capital evolve according to
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the following dynamic equations:
ks,t+1 = (1 − ds )kst + ist

(3.4)

ke,t+1 = (1 − de )ket + iet ,

(3.5)

where de and ds are the depreciation rates of capital equipment and capital structures
respectively.
Both At and qt are assumed to follow AR(1) processes,
At = A + κA At−1 + ǫA,t ,
qt = q + κq qt−1 + ǫq,t .

(3.6)
(3.7)

The two shocks, ǫA,t and ǫq,t are independent normal variables with respective standard
deviations ηA and ηq .
Each firm operating in the intermediate goods sector is either matched with an unskilled
worker, matched with a skilled worker or posts a vacancy. If matched, it receives, from
the competitive final sector, plt = Fl (t) or pht = Fh (t). There is free entry of firms. Firms
attract unemployed workers by posting a vacancy at the flow cost cT . Once matched,
workers and firms separate exogenously with probability sT per period. Employed workers
are paid a wage wtT , and firms make accounting profits of pTt − wtT per worker each period
in which they operate. Unemployed workers get flow utility z T from leisure/non-market
activity.

3.2.2

Matching

Let uTt denote the number of unemployed people and nTt = N T − uTt the number of
employed people from group T (nL = l and nH = h). Let vtT be the number of vacancies
posted in period t. We refer to θtT = vtT /uTt as the market tightness at time t for type T .
L
The aggregate market tightness is defined as θt = (vtH + vtL )/(uH
t + ut ).
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The number of new matches (starting to produce output at t + 1) is given by a constant returns to scale matching function mT (uTt , vtT ) ≤ min(uTt , vtT ). Employment evolves
according to the following law of motion:
nTt+1 = (1 − sT )nTt + mT (uTt , vtT ).

(3.8)

The probability that an unemployed worker will be matched with a vacancy next period
equals f T (θtT ) = mT (uTt , vtT )/uTt = mT (1, θtT ). The probability that a vacancy will be
filled next period equals φT (θtT ) = mT (uTt , vtT )/vtT = mT (1/θtT , 1) = f T (θtT )/θtT .

3.2.3

Equilibrium

Denote the firm’s value of a job (a filled vacancy) by J T , the firm’s value of an unfilled
vacancy by V T , the worker’s value of having a job by W T , and the worker’s value of
being unemployed by U T . Bellman equations (3.9)-(3.12) describe an equilibrium of the
model where J T , W T , U T and V T depend on the current shocks to productivity At and
qt and the stock of low-skilled lt and the stock of high-skilled ht . Let xt = (At , qt , lt , ht )
be today’s state vector and xt+1 = (At+1 , qt+1 , lt+1 , ht+1 ) be next period’s state vector.
The two capital stocks ke and ks do not have to be included in the state vector, since risk
neutrality implies that they are already functions of x.5

5

JxTt

= pTxt − wxTt + δ(1 − sT )Ext JxTt+1

VxTt

= −cT + δφT (θxTt )Ext JxTt+1

(3.10)

UxTt

= ztT + δ{f T (θxTt )Ext WxTt+1 + (1 − f T (θxTt ))Ext UxTt+1 }

(3.11)

WxTt

= wxTt + δ{(1 − sT )Ext WxTt+1 + sT Ext UxTt+1 }.

(3.12)

(3.9)

The two first-order conditions for capital equipment and capital structures describe period t capital

stocks as functions of xt only because risk neutrality implies that the real interest rate is constant. Without
risk neutrality this simplification would not be possible, since the period t interest rate would depend on
consumption in period t and t + 1.
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The interpretation is straightforward. Operating firms earn profits pTxt − wxTt and the
matches are exogenously destroyed with probability sT . A vacancy costs cT and is matched
with a worker (becomes productive in period t + 1) with probability φT (θxTt ). An unemployed worker derives utility z T and finds a job next period with probability f T (θxTt ). An
employed worker earns wage wxTt but may lose her job with probability sT and become unemployed next period. Nash bargaining implies that a worker and a firm split the surplus
SxTt = JxTt + WxTt − UxTt such that
JxTt = (1 − β T )SxTt ,

(3.13)

WxTt − UxTt = β T SxTt .

(3.14)

Free entry implies that the value of posting a vacancy is zero: VxTt = 0 for all xt and,
therefore,
cT

= δφT (θxTt )Ext JxTt+1
= δφT (θxTt )(1 − β T )Ext SxTt+1 .

(3.15)

The Bellman equation for the surplus is:
SxTt = pTxt − (z T + δf T (θxTt )β T Ext SxTt+1 ) + δ(1 − sT )ExTt SxTt+1 .

(3.16)

To compute expectations, one has to know how the state variables evolve. The two
productivity processes evolve according to the VAR(1) described above. The value of
marginal productivity pT next period is endogenous and depends on how many workers
are working today, how many vacancies are posted and how much capital is invested.
The market for capital equipment and structures is perfectly competitive and, each
period, firms can rent capital to maximize profits. Households own the capital stock and
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invest to maximize their utility, which leads to the two first-order conditions for capital:6
1
Et Fks (t + 1) + (1 − ds ) = ,
δ
qt
1
qt Et Fke (t + 1) + (1 − de )Et
= .
qt+1
δ

(3.17)
(3.18)

Note, that the decision on ke,t+1 is taken in period t, but that the relative price of investment goods next period, qt+1 , matters for this decision as well.
We now derive the expressions for equilibrium wages and profits, which, except for
being dependent on the type, take the usual form.7 Because firms can buy and sell capital
in a competitive market, the wage bargain is not affected as in Pissarides (2000). Using
equation (3.13), it follows from the free-entry condition (3.15) and the flow equation (3.9)
for J T that:
(1 − β T )SxTt = pTxt − wxTt + (1 − sT )cT /φT (θxTt ).

(3.19)

Free entry and (3.16) imply that
SxTt = pTxt − z T + (1 − sT − f T (θxTt )β)

cT
φT (θxTt )(1

− βT )

.

(3.20)

Thus, we have that
(1 − β T )SxTt = (1 − β T )(pTxt − z T ) + cT

1 − sT − f T (θxTt )β T
.
φT (θxTt )

(3.21)

Rearranging (3.19) and substituting using (3.21), we find that wages are given by
wxTt

= pTxt − (1 − β T )SxTt + (1 − sT )cT /φT (θxTt )
= β T pTxt + (1 − β T )z T + cT β T θxTt ,

6

To see the second equation note that the ke,t+1 is chosen to maximize . . . −

(3.22)
ke,t+1
qt

+ δEt (rt+1 ke,t+1 +

(1−de )ke,t+1
)
qt+1
7

+ . . ., where r = Fke is the interest rate in the rental market.
It is well known that only the present value of wages and not the specific sequence of wages matters. We

adopt here the standard assumption of Nash bargaining to pin down this sequence. Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2009) provide evidence that this assumption is more consistent with the data than the alternative based
on contracts through which firms insure workers against aggregate shocks.
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and accounting profits are given by
ΠTxt = pTxt − wxTt = (1 − β T )(pTxt − z T ) − cT β T θxTt .

3.3

(3.23)

Calibration

In this section we calibrate the model to match U.S. labor market facts. We define the
variables consistently with Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) and conduct
a measurement that ensures the comparability of our results to the large body of existing
work on the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies. In particular, we measure
capital structures and equipment, output and employment in the non-farm business sector.
As in Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000), the sample is restricted to individuals between 16 and 70 years old. The unskilled category includes individuals who have a
high school diploma or less. The skilled category includes college-educated workers. Labor
market data for the two subgroups comes from the monthly Current Population Surveys
(CPS) from January 1976 to December 2006 and the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups
(ORG) covering the period January 1979 to December 2006. To aggregate individual observations we use CPS sample weights. On average over the sample period there are 2.6379
unskilled workers for each skilled worker. Whenever we are interested in cyclical properties
of a variable observed at quarterly frequency, we use the HP-filter (Prescott (1986)) with
a smoothing parameter of 1600. The data and variable construction procedures we use are
detailed in Appendix 3.7.1.

Basics. We choose the model period to be one week (one-twelfth of a quarter), which is
lower than the frequency of the employment data we use, but necessary to deal with time
aggregation. The data used to compute some of the targets have monthly, quarterly or
annual frequency, and we aggregate the model appropriately when matching those targets.
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We set δ = 0.991/12 .

Job-Finding and Separation Rates. Using the CPS, we estimate, using the Shimer
(2005b) two-state model described in Appendix 3.7.1, the average monthly job-finding rate
to be 0.3618 for skilled workers and 0.4185 for unskilled workers. The total separation rate
(into unemployment, non-employment and job-to-job), not adjusted for time aggregation,
for high-skilled equals 0.042 and for low-skilled 0.064 (Fallick and Fleischman (2004)). The
separation rate into unemployment, also not adjusted for time aggregation, equals 0.0097
for the skilled and 0.0378 for the unskilled. We make this distinction between the rates of
total separation and separation into unemployment, since what matters for firms’ decisions
is the expected duration of an employment spell, and this duration depends on the total
rate of separation. We use this separation rate when modeling firms’ decisions. To describe
the average level and the evolution of unemployment for the two groups (Equation 3.8)
we use the separation rate into unemployment only.
At a weekly frequency these estimates imply job-finding rates of f H = 0.1062 and
f L = 0.1268, total job separation rates of sH = 0.0105 and sL = 0.016, rates of separation
L
into unemployment sH
U = 0.0029 and sU = 0.0117, and steady state unemployment rates
H
H
L
L
L
L
8
of uH = sH
U /(sU + f ) = 0.0262 and u = sU /(sU + f ) = 0.0846. These steady state

unemployment rates are very similar to the average unemployment rate in the data of
8

We now illustrate this adjustment procedure in the case of skilled workers. The probability of not

finding a job within a month is 1 − 0.3603 = 0.6382. The probability of not finding a job within a week then
equals 0.63821/4 = 0.8938 and the probability of finding a job equals 1 − 0.8938 = 0.1062. The probability
of observing someone not having a job who had a job one month ago equals (counting paths in a probability
tree): s{(1−f )(f s+(1−f )2 )+f (s(1−f )+(1−s)s)}+(1−s){s(f s+(1−f )2 )+(1−s)(s(1−f )+(1−s)s)} =
0.0097. Solving for s, we obtain s = 0.0029.
The total separation rate does not have to be adjusted for time aggregation, since it does not matter
whether a worker switches employers once or multiple times between observation points. All we need to
know is that the previous employment relationship ended.
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0.0263 for skilled workers and 0.0838 for unskilled ones.9
Petronglo and Pissarides (2001) survey the empirical evidence and conclude that the
value of 0.5 for the elasticity of the aggregate job-finding rate with respect to aggregate
labor market tightness is appropriate. By skill group, the elasticity of the job-finding
probability with respect to overall labor market tightness is higher for high-skilled workers
by a factor of 1.3345.

Production Function Parameters. We use the elasticity parameters of the production
function α = 0.117, σ = 0.401, and ρ = −0.495 and weekly depreciation rates of structures
and equipment ds = 0.001068 and de = 0.002778 estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull,
and Violante (2000). Given the values of these parameters and the average employment
levels of high- and low-skilled workers, we normalize the average stock of capital structures,
ks = 399.7251, capital equipment, ke = 389.8385, and aggregate productivity A = 0.4197,
and find the distribution parameters λ = 0.9341 and µ = .7445 as solutions to a system
of five equations. The system includes the first-order conditions (3.17) and (3.18) for
structures and equipment, the normalization that the marginal product of low-skilled
labor is equal to 1, the condition that the labor share is 2/3 of output, and the condition
that the ratio of the marginal products of skilled and unskilled workers is equal to 1.9846,
on average.10
The productivity of the two labor inputs is affected by the volatility of capital structures
and equipment over the business cycle. In the data, the standard deviation of HP-filtered
9

Those workers who get separated from firms but do not become unemployed can be thought of as being

hired by a large firm or by the government. This hiring presumably involves no search frictions due to the
sheer size of these employers. These large firms hire at a constant rate sT − sTU and workers get separated
at rate sTU into unemployment.
10
The last target is consistent with the competitive model but may not hold exactly in the model with
search frictions. This theoretical inconsistency has a negligible impact on our findings because, in our
calibration, the average wage is close to the marginal product.
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log capital structures is 0.0028 and the standard deviation of HP-filtered log qualityadjusted capital equipment is 0.0100 (see Appendix 3.7.1). To ensure that the model
matches the cyclical volatility of the capital series, we allow the depreciation rates for
capital structures and equipment to depend on aggregate productivity. In particular, we
introduce and calibrate a parameter d∗e and specify the depreciation of capital equipment at
∗

time t to equal de ∗ (ke,t /k e )de . Thus, if equilibrium capital equipment stock ke,t in period
t is equal to the average capital equipment k e , the depreciation rate is given by de . If
capital in some periods deviates from its steady state value, the depreciation rate deviates
in the same direction. The strength of the response of the depreciation rate is governed by
parameter d∗e . The depreciation rate for capital structures is defined symmetrically with
parameters ds and d∗s .11
Neutral and Capital Equipment-Specific Technologies. We use the estimated production function parameters and compute the quarterly series for At and qt . We set qt
equal to the NIPA price of consumption goods (non-durables and services), pct , divided
by the price of equipment investment goods, pet . We use the pet series constructed by
Schorfheide, Rios-Rull, Fuentes-Albero, Santaeulalia-Llopis, and Kryshko (2007). (They
extend the annual series of Cummins and Violante (2002) to 2006 and convert the annual
series to quarterly frequency similar to Fisher (2006)). We use the resulting price series
to construct the quality-adjusted stock of capital equipment using the perpetual inventory
11

The only reason for variable depreciation rates is to generate the right volatilities of the two capital

stocks. Alternatively we could treat the capital stocks as exogenous and just calibrate the two processes.
This approach would leave our quantitative analysis unchanged. However, we could not conduct any policy
experiments, a main objective of this paper, since the capital stock responds to changes in taxation in our
environment but would not if capital is exogenous. Departing from linear utility would also reduce the
volatility of capital and capital would be an endogenous variable. However, the data imply an asymmetric
adjustment of the volatilities of the two capital stocks whereas a departure from linear utility would
presumably lead to a symmetric reduction.
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method.
We log and linearly de-trend the At and qt series and use the resulting series to estimate
the VAR in (3.6) and (3.7). To calibrate this process in the model, we consider quarterly
averages of weekly productivity. We find that at weekly frequency we must set κA = 0.9936,
κq = 0.9988, ǫA = 0.0035, and ǫq = 0.0019 to match the process in the data. We also
normalize the average q = 1 and the average productivity of an unskilled worker equal to
one, which requires setting A = .4197.

Labor Market Tightness. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) estimate an average value
of labor market tightness of 0.634. This value lies between the estimates of 0.539 obtained
by Hall (2005) and 0.72 obtained by Pissarides (2007).
In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) we used data on the time and costs involved in
recruiting workers from the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey and the
1992 Small Business Administration survey reported in Barron, Berger, and Black (1997).
These authors also estimate the vacancy duration equation D = c0 + c1 X using the same
datasets, where D is the log of the duration time and X is the set of controls including the
log number of years of education, and report that the education coefficient is statistically
significant in both datasets and equal to 0.886 and 2.432, respectively. The average years
of education in our sample for high-skilled and low-skilled workers are equal to edH = 16.54
and edL = 10.83, respectively. This implies that vacancies for high skilled workers last
drel = (edH /edL )c1 = 2.128 times longer, where the actual number represents the average
across the two data sets. The ratio of the market tightnesses across groups is then given by
θrel = f H /f L ∗ drel = 1.78. Finally, using the data on the numbers of skilled and unskilled
unemployed workers, the aggregate θ, and the relative θrel of high skilled workers we obtain
that θL = 0.5858 and θH = 1.0442.
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Matching Functions. We choose the Cobb-Douglas functional form of the matching
functions of skilled and unskilled workers:
T

T

m(uT , v T ) = χT (uT )γ (v T )1−γ .

(3.24)

The two parameters, χT , γ T , that characterize the matching function differ for the two
types. This allows us to match a different job-finding probability and a different elasticity
of the job-finding probability with respect to labor market tightness.

The Cyclicality of Wages. Over the 1979:1-2006:4 period we find that a 1-percentagepoint increase in labor productivity is associated with a 0.674-percentage-point increase in
average real wages. Wages are measured as the non-farm business labor share constructed
by the BLS times labor productivity defined as seasonally adjusted real non-farm business
output constructed by the BLS from the NIPA divided by seasonally adjusted non-farm
business employment form the monthly Current Population Survey. Both time series are in
logs and HP-detrended. We also use CPS data to estimate the wage elasticity with respect
to average output per person for each group separately. We find that wages for high-skilled
workers are more cyclical than wages of low-skilled. The ratio of the two elasticities equals
1.771. The estimates reported in Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) imply a very similar ratio
of wage elasticities. To obtain the corresponding estimates in the model, we first aggregate
the weekly model-generated data to replicate the quarterly frequency of the data. We then
log and HP-filter the time series and estimate regressions identical to those estimated in
the data.12
12

Keane and Prasad (1991) and Prasad (1996) report, using NLSY from 1966-1981, similar magnitudes

for the cyclicality of wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We replicated their analysis using the NLSY
1979 data (over the 1979:1-2006:4 period that corresponds to the coverage of the CPS data we use). See
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2009) for a detailed description of NLSY 1979 and the variable construction
procedures. We found a ratio of the wage elasticities for high and low skilled workers that is remarkably
close to the number we computed based on the CPS data. These findings suggest that the properties of
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The Costs of Posting Vacancies. In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) we found that
the expected labor costs of posting vacancies equals 50.23% of average weekly labor productivity. The flow capital costs of posting vacancies equals 47.4% of average weekly labor
productivity, which equals 1.2707, so that the capital costs equal 0.6023. The analysis from
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) for these average numbers applies here as well. However,
the presence of capital-skill complementarity and two types of capital implies that the
numbers for the two groups are different.
For labor costs it is simple. We find that the skill premium in the data equals 1.9846.
The expected costs of a vacancy in the model equals

cT
W
φT

, where cTW is the flow cost and φT is

the probability of filling a vacancy. The numbers we report above imply that φH = 0.1017
and φL = 0.2165. Solving

cL
W
φL

= 0.5023 and

cH
W
φH

= 1.9846 · 0.5023, we find cH
W = 0.1014

and cL
W = 0.1087.
The specification of the production function in Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) features capital-skill complementarity, so that more capital is bought when
a high-skilled worker is hired than when a low-skilled worker is hired. The relative sizes
of capital equipment and capital structures needed can be computed from the first-order
conditions (3.17) and (3.18). For skilled workers, the implicit function theorem provides
us with two functions ks (h) and ke (h) solving the two first-order conditions, keeping the
number of unskilled workers fixed. Analogously for unskilled workers, we get two functions
ks (l) and ke (l). The relative capital needs for capital equipment then equals
the relative capital needs for capital structures equals
at the steady state gives

∂ke (h)
∂h
∂ke (l)
∂l

= 8.3384 and

∂ks (h)
∂h
∂ks (l)
∂l

∂ks (h)
∂h
∂ks (l)
∂l

∂ke (h)
∂h
∂ke (l)
∂l

and

. Evaluating these expressions

= 1.9846.

We can now compute the flow capital costs for high-skilled cH
e (for equipment) and
wages shifted in the early 1980s. This is also consistent with the finding of Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2009), who report that the relative volatility of labor income of high earners (likely correlated with being
more educated) increased sharply around the early 1980s.
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L
L
cH
s (for structures) and for low skilled: ce (for equipment) and cs (for structures). The
L
H
L
different capital needs imply that cH
e = 8.3384ce and cs = 1.9846cs .
H

L

v
L v
The average flow cost for equipment equals cH
e v H +v L +ce v H +v L and that for structures
L

H

v
L v
equals cH
s v H +v L + cs v H +v L . Since the capital income share for structures equals 0.117 and

that for equipment equals (1/3 − 0.117) we solve
vH
vL
L
+
c
e H
vH + vL
v + vL
vL
vH
L
+
c
cH
s H
s H
v + vL
v + vL
cH
e

=
=

1/3 − 0.117
0.6023
2/3
0.117
0.6023
1/3

(3.25)
(3.26)

H
L
L
We find cH
e = 1.4359, cs = 0.3585, ce = 0.1722 and cs = 0.1806. Thus, overall, the flow

costs of posting a vacancy for high-skilled workers equals cH = 1.4359 + 0.3585 + 0.1014 =
1.8958 and for low-skilled workers it equals cL = 0.1722 + 0.1806 + 0.1087 = 0.4615.
Remaining Parameters. Ten parameters remain to be determined: the values of nonmarket activity, z H , z L , worker’s bargaining weights, β H , β L , the matching function parameters, χH , χL , γ H , γ L , and depreciation factors for capital structures and equipment,
d∗s , d∗e . We choose the values for these parameters to match the data on the average value
for labor market tightness for skilled and unskilled workers, the elasticity of wages with
respect to aggregate productivity, the relative elasticity of wages with respect to aggregate productivity of skilled and unskilled workers, the average values for the job-finding
rates of skilled and unskilled workers, the elasticity of the aggregate job-finding rate with
respect to aggregate labor market tightness, the relative elasticity of the job-finding rate
with respect to aggregate labor market tightness of skilled and unskilled workers, and the
standard deviations of capital structures and equipment. Thus, there are ten targets, all
described in the previous paragraphs, to pin down ten parameters.
To find the values of these parameters we solve the model numerically according to the
computational algorithm described in Appendix 3.7.2. The performance of the model in
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matching calibration targets is described in Table 3.1. We are able to match the targets
almost exactly. Calibrated parameter values can be found in Table 3.2. To understand
these results, it is useful to recall how the two key parameters - the bargaining power and
the value of non-market activity - are determined in the homogeneous worker case (Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)). The bargaining power is chosen to match the elasticity of
wages, since a higher bargaining power of workers makes wages more responsive to changes
in productivity. The level of non-market activity is then chosen to match the average level
of wages. The average level of wages, holding fixed other parameters such as the separation rate and the interest rate, depends one-for-one on expected hiring costs c/φ, since a
higher level of expected costs requires higher profits and thus lower average wages. The
same logic applies here. Since expected vacancy posting costs c/φ are about four times
higher for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled workers (relative to productivity), z H
is substantially lower than z L (relative to productivity). The bargaining power is again
chosen to match the elasticity of wages with one modification. We match the elasticity
of wages with respect to average productivity and not with respect to marginal productivity, since the latter is not directly observable. For the targeted elasticity it holds that
ǫwT ,p = ǫwT ,pT · ǫpT ,p , which makes a difference, since ǫpT ,p does not equal one (ǫx,y denotes
the elasticity of x with respect to y.). We find that ǫpH ,p = 1.316 and ǫpL ,p = 0.935,
since changes in capital equipment mainly affect pH . In equilibrium, the effect due to
a higher volatility of productivity for high-skilled workers outweighs the effect due to a
higher productivity elasticity of their wages, implying a lower bargaining power for them
compared to low-skilled workers. A similar reasoning applies to measuring the elasticity
of the matching function. It is identified by the elasticity of the job-finding rate with
respect to the aggregate market tightness θ because θT is not observable. It holds that
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Table 3.1: Matching the Calibration Targets.

Target

Value
Data

Model

1.

Elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫw,p

0.674

0.671

2.

Relative elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫwH ,p /ǫwL ,p

1.770

1.774

3.

Skilled job-finding rate, f H

0.106

0.105

4.

Unskilled job-finding rate, f L

0.127

0.126

5.

Skilled average market tightness, θH

1.044

1.047

6.

Unskilled average market tightness, θL

0.586

0.585

7.

Elasticity of agg. job-finding wrt agg. market tightness, ǫf,θ

0.500

0.513

8.

Relative elas. of job-finding wrt agg. mrkt tightness, ǫf H ,θ /ǫf L ,θ

1.335

1.332

9.

Standard deviation of capital structures

0.003

0.003

10.

Standard deviation of capital equipment

0.010

0.010

Note: The table describes the performance of the model in matching the calibration targets.

ǫf T ,θ = ǫf T ,θT · ǫθT ,θ . We find that ǫθH ,θ = 0.837 and ǫθL ,θ = 1.056.13 The choice of the
remaining parameters is simple. The matching function efficiency parameter χT determines the job finding rate and the depreciation factors are chosen to match the standard
deviations of capital structures and equipment.

3.4

Business-Cycle Properties of the Model

The statistics of interest, computed from quarterly U.S. data from 1979:1-2006:4 and the
results from the calibrated model are presented in Table 3.3.

Aggregate Results. A comparison between the corresponding statistics reveals that
13

Note that f T (θT ) = χT (θT )1−γ

T

and

(1−γ H )ǫθH ,θ
(1−γ L )ǫθL ,θ

=

0.801·0.837
0.471·1.056

= 1.348, very close to the target for

ǫf H ,θ /ǫf L ,θ . The small difference arises since we compute our targets on model generated data.
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Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameter Values.

Parameter

Definition

Value

zH

skilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.813

zL

unskilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.929

βH

skilled workers’ bargaining power

0.069

βL

unskilled workers’ bargaining power

0.112

γH

skilled matching function elasticity

0.199

γL

unskilled matching function elasticity

0.529

χH

skilled matching function efficiency

0.102

χL

unskilled matching function efficiency

0.164

d∗s

depreciation factor of capital structures

11.200

d∗e

depreciation factor of capital equipment

1.399

Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the benchmark calibration.

the model matches the key business-cycle facts quite well. In particular, the volatility of
aggregate labor market tightness, unemployment, and vacancies is quite close to that in the
data. Moreover, the model generates a strong negative correlation between unemployment
and vacancies, i.e., the Beveridge curve.

Results by Skill Group. In the data the unemployment rate is 2.6% for skilled workers
and 8.4% for unskilled ones. Both of these rates are highly volatile, with respective standard deviations of the HP-filtered logged unemployment rate of 0.111 and 0.085. Thus,
while low-skilled workers account for most of the fluctuations in unemployment, the unemployment rate of skilled workers is even more volatile in percentage terms.14
The model does an excellent job in matching these observations. It generates unem14

Interestingly, Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) show that over the time period that we study even

employment of skilled workers is more volatile than that of low-skilled workers.
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Table 3.3: Data and Results from the Calibrated Model.

Statistic

Value
Data

Model

1.

St. dev. of agg. productivity, p

0.013

0.013

2.

Autocorr. of agg. productivity, p

0.765

0.765

3.

St. dev. of agg. unemployment, u

0.090

0.086

4.

St. dev. of agg. vacancies, v

0.116

0.110

5.

St. dev. of agg. market tightness, θ

0.202

0.196

6.

Corr. of agg. unemployment and vacancies

-0.910

-0.777

1.

St. dev. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.018

2.

Autocorr. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.782

3.

St. dev. of skilled unemployment, uH

0.111

0.114

4.

St. dev. of skilled vacancies, v H

—

0.078

5.

St. dev. of skilled market tightness, θH

—

0.162

1.

St. dev. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.013

2.

Autocorr. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.763

3.

St. dev. of unskilled unemployment, uL

0.085

0.083

4.

St. dev. of unskilled vacancies, v L

—

0.133

5.

St. dev. of unskilled market tightness, θL

—

0.206

Note: Seasonally adjusted aggregate unemployment, u, is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Seasonally adjusted skill-group unemployment, uH and
uL , is constructed by the authors from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally
adjusted help-wanted advertising index, v, is constructed by the Conference Board. u, uH , uL , and v are
quarterly averages of monthly series. Average labor productivity p is seasonally adjusted quarterly real
non-farm business output constructed by the BLS from the NIPA divided by non-farm business employment
from the monthly Current Population Survey. All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP
trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
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ployment rates of 2.6% for skilled workers and 8.4% for unskilled ones, with respective
standard deviations of the HP-filtered logged unemployment rate of 0.114 and 0.083. To
understand these results we compute these statistics twice for two economies populated by
homogeneous agents only. The first economy is populated by low skilled workers only and
we thus use the parameters for unskilled workers from our heterogeneous agent economy.
The second economy is populated by high skilled workers only and we thus use the parameters for skilled workers from our heterogeneous agent economy. We find that for the
skilled worker economy, market tightness is 9.2 times more volatile than their productivity.
This high value, despite a low value of z H = 0.813, is mainly due to two differences between an economy consisting only of skilled workers and the representative agent economy
(the homogeneous agent economy calibrated to the same aggregate statistics as in this
paper). First, the productivity process for high-skilled workers is more persistent than for
the representative agent. Second, the matching function elasticity for skilled workers, γ H ,
equals 0.199 whereas this elasticity equals 0.5 in the representative agent case. Equation
(3.27) in Footnote 15 explains why such a difference in the matching function elasticities
results in a different productivity elasticity of market tightness. The high ratio of the
volatility of market tightness to the volatility of productivity then translates into a high
volatility of market tightness since the productivity process for high-skilled workers is also
more volatile than for the representative agent.
For unskilled workers, the standard deviation of HP-filtered log market tightness θL
is 0.206, which is 15.8 times higher than the volatility of their productivity. This higher
volatility for low-skilled workers is due to a higher value of z L = 0.929 (relative to their
productivity). In the representative agent model of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), a
value of z = 0.94 would be required to generate a volatility of market tightness of 0.206. A
value of z = 0.929 would generate a volatility of only 0.177 in that model. The difference
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is due to a separation rate of low-skilled workers that is higher than the one used in the
representative agent economy in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008).15
The matching function translates the volatility of market tightness into volatile unemployment. For each group, the steady state elasticity of unemployment with respect to
productivity can be expressed as
ǫuT ,pT = ǫuT ,f T · ǫf T ,θT · ǫθT ,pT = −(1 −

uT
)(1 − γ T )ǫθT ,pT
NT

(3.28)

Our finding that 1 − γ H = 1 − 0.199 is substantially larger than 1 − γ L = 1 − 0.529 explains
why high-skilled unemployment is more volatile than low-skilled unemployment, although
the opposite ordering between groups holds for market tightness.
The aggregate statistics targeted in this paper differ from those in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). We now calibrate the linear model with homogeneous workers in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) to match these same aggregate statistics. In particular, we
target a wage elasticity of 0.67 (instead of 0.45 in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)) and
also make the distinction between the total separation rate and the separation rate into
unemployment. We find a standard deviation of market tightness of 0.11 and a standard
deviation of unemployment of 0.049, which represent only about one-half of the corresponding numbers in the data. As we have shown above, only after we allow for heterogeneity,
the model is able to replicate the observed volatilities. Two simple observations explain
this finding. First, the volatility of unemployment is an increasing and convex function
of z (see equation (3.27)). Second, the calibrated value of z in the homogeneous worker
model lies between the two values z H and z L and is close to their weighted average. As a
15

In Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) we derive, in the model without aggregate uncertainty, the elasticity

of labor market tightness with respect to aggregate productivity to be:
ǫθ,p

=

βf (θ) + (1 − δ(1 − s))/δ
p
,
p − z βf (θ) + (1 − η)(1 − δ(1 − s))/δ

(3.27)

where η is the elasticity of f (θ) with respect to θ. This equation may be used to quite accurately evaluate
the impact of various parameter values, such as the separation rate, on the volatility of market tightness.
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consequence, low-skilled unemployment and thus also overall unemployment are substantially more volatile than unemployment in the homogeneous worker model. To summarize,
we find that the extended MP model calibrated using the strategy proposed in Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) is consistent with labor market volatilities in the aggregate, once
we allow for heterogeneity, and in subgroups.

Robustness. The only target in our benchmark calibration that is not standard is the
elasticity of wages with respect to aggregate productivity. Recall that we define productivity as non-farm business output divided by employment from the monthly Current
Population Survey. Shimer (2005a) used the same measure of output but divided it by
employment measured in the Current Employment Statistics. The estimated elasticity of
wages with respect to aggregate productivity is affected by this choice. Our measure of
productivity implies an elasticity of 0.67, while Shimer’s measure implies an elasticity of
only 0.5.16 We now recalibrate the model to match the same calibration targets but target
a low wage elasticity of 0.5.
The performance of the model in matching the calibration targets with a low wage
elasticity, the calibrated parameter values, and the results are described in Appendix
Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, respectively. The changes in the calibrated values of the bargaining
power β and the value of non-market activity z are as expected. A lower value for the
targeted wage elasticity for both groups leads to lower values for the bargaining power of
both types, β H and β L . Since the expected costs of posting vacancies remain unchanged,
per period profits and thus average wages do not change either. To generate the same
level of wages with a lower bargaining power requires then a higher value of non-market
16

The differences between the cyclical properties of these series are documented in Hagedorn and

Manovskii (2007). There we argue why a productivity measure based on CPS employment might be
preferred.
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activity for both types, z H and z L . Higher values of non-market activity result in more
volatile labor market variables in the aggregate and for each worker type as compared to
the benchmark calibration.
An additional benefit of this experiment is that it (coincidentally) targets virtually the
same aggregate statistics computed over the 1951-2004 period as in Shimer (2005a) and
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). For comparison, we reproduce these statistics in Column
(1) of Appendix Table 3.9 and the results from the calibration of the linear MP model
with homogeneous workers in Column (3) (targeting the same aggregate statistics as in the
model with heterogeneity). A comparison of the results based on the model with worker
heterogeneity with the results from the linear model implies that the model with worker
heterogeneity again generates a higher volatility of aggregate labor market statistics and
is closer to the data than the homogeneous worker model.
A new feature of our calibration is that we make a distinction between the total separation rate and the separation rate into unemployment. We now recalibrate the model to
match the same calibration targets but without making this distinction. The performance
of the model in matching the calibration targets, calibrated parameter values, and results
are described in Appendix Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12, respectively. A lower total separation rate increases expected profits from a filled vacancy. Since vacancy posting costs are
unchanged, a higher value of non-market activity z is required to keep profits unchanged.
A higher value of z leads to more volatility in market tightness and in wages. Thus a lower
value of the bargaining weight is chosen to match a wage elasticity of 0.67. Again the
model with heterogeneity is closer to the data, since the linear model with homogeneous
workers generates too little volatility.
Finally, we have assumed throughout the paper that the two shocks, ǫA,t and ǫq,t are
independent. Estimating their correlation in the data, we obtain a correlation of 0.2644.
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We have recalibrated the model with this correlation and found that our results are not
affected. Introducing this correlation makes capital slightly more volatile because the price
of capital equipment is lower when TFP is higher. However, the depreciation factors adjust
to match capital volatility in the data, and all other statistics remain unchanged.

3.5

Policy Experiments

In this section we investigate the effects of changes in tax policies under two scenarios.
First, when productivity is exogenous and second, when productivity is endogenous because workers are heterogeneous and interact through the production side of the economy.
Specifically, we consider how unemployment responds to changes in the labor income tax
rate, in the sales tax and in the capital income tax rate in the two scenarios. The effects
of these policy changes are easy to compute since they are equivalent to changing the
value of non-market activity, or equivalently changing labor productivity. Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) show that the equilibrium with a labor tax rate τw is equivalent to the
equilibrium without a labor tax but where z is replaced by

z
1−τw .

An equilibrium with a

sales tax of τs is equivalent to an equilibrium without a sales tax but where productivity
p is replace by p(1 − τs ). Finally, imposing a capital income tax rate τk changes optimal
capital accumulation in a steady state (with the normalization q = 1) according to the
two equations:
1
− 1,
δ
1
(Fke (t + 1) − de )(1 − τk ) = − 1.
δ

(Fks (t + 1) − ds )(1 − τk ) =

(3.29)
(3.30)

The direct impact of taxing capital income is to lower investment, which then leads to a
drop in labor productivity.
Another policy change, an increase in unemployment insurance, is theoretically equivalent to a change in sales taxes. However, as shown in Faig and Zhang (2008) and Zhang
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(2008), such a policy change should take into account that entitlement to unemployment
insurance benefits must be earned with employment. In this case, an increase in unemployment insurance generosity has a small effect on unemployment, much smaller than a
change in tax rates.17 We therefore concentrate on the evaluation of the effects of tax
policies.
In the next section, we analyze how productivity and unemployment respond to policy
changes theoretically before assessing its quantitative performance. We study the effects of
changes in z (corresponding to a change in labor taxes), but all of our results fully apply
to changes in consumption taxes and capital income tax rates since only the difference
between p and z, p − z matters.

3.5.1

Theoretical Analysis

In this section, we show that a change in z changes not only employment but also productivity, which can mitigate or amplify the changes in employment. If, for example, an
increase in z increases productivity, the drop in employment is smaller than it would be
with a constant level of productivity. To show this we consider a simplified (relative to
(3.2)) constant return to scale (CRS) production technology
yt = G(l, h, k),
17

(3.31)

They show that an increase in unemployment benefits by itself lowers the unemployment rate. The

overall effect has however to take into account that higher unemployment benefits have to be financed with
higher taxes which lead to a higher unemployment rate.
Another aspect is that changes in unemployment insurance lead to important substitution effects. For
instance, Gruber and Cullen (2000) find that for each dollar of a husband’s unemployment insurance
received, wives earn 73 cents less. Moreover, a higher replacement rate crowds out private (precautionary)
savings (Gruber and Engen (2001)). Taking into account the latter two effects will presumably further
dampen the effect of changes in unemployment insurance.
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where k is capital and l and h are two different labor types, and G is increasing and
concave in each argument.18
A drop in l (due to an increase in z l ) increases the productivity Gl of low-skilled workers
if the levels of h and k are unchanged. But h and k adjust as well, and this adjustment
can overturn this conclusion, depending on the properties of G. The following sections
investigate these properties.
Equilibrium Conditions for Capital, Employment and Market Tightness
Given the production function G, we now consider how the productivities Gl , Gh and Gk ,
labor inputs l and h, capital k and the policy parameter z are related.
Capital solves the first-order condition (d is the depreciation rate)
Gk =

1
− (1 − d),
δ

(3.32)

which defines capital implicitly as a function of l and h: k(l, h).
For the two labor inputs, we can derive in the case of no aggregate uncertainty (see
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)) the following relationship between market tightness and
productivity for each group (we suppress the dependence on type T ).
p−z
1 − δ(1 − s)
+ βθ =
(1 − β).
δq(θ)
c

(3.33)

The steady state conditions for employment l and h are
l=

f L (θL )
f H (θH )
and
h
=
.
sL + f L (θL )
sH + f H (θH )

(3.34)

The last two equations together imply two functions that relate the level of employment
18

The technology in (3.2) takes this form for α = 0. Since (3.2) combines capital structures and G

through a Cobb-Douglas aggregator, assuming (3.2) would not change the conclusions of this section. The
Cobb-Douglas specification implies that capital structures change one-for-one with G.
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to p and z:
l = L(pl , z l ),

(3.35)

h = H(ph , z h ).

(3.36)

Denote the marginal productivity of group l:
pl = Gl (l, h, k),

(3.37)

and the marginal productivity of group h:
ph = Gh (l, h, k).

(3.38)

Taking into account that capital k is a function of l and h, k(l, h), allows us to express
productivities as functions of l and h only
pl = Gl (l, h, k(l, h)) = π l (l, h),

(3.39)

ph = Gh (l, h, k(l, h)) = π h (l, h).

(3.40)

Plugging the expression for L(pl , z l ) and H(ph , z h ) into the functions π, results in two
functions A and B:
pl = A(pl , z l , ph , z h ) = π l (L(pl , z l ), H(ph , z h )),

(3.41)

ph = B(pl , z l , ph , z h ) = π h (L(pl , z l ), H(ph , z h )),

(3.42)

which jointly describe the two productivity levels (pl , ph ) as a fixed point, depending on
the two parameters (z l , z h ). We now want to investigate how changing (z l , z h ) affects the
fixed point (pl , ph ).
Productivity changes
To characterize how productivity (pl , ph ) depends on (z l , z h ) requires knowing how the
functions A and B depend on productivities (pl , ph ). The next proposition accomplishes
this.
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Proposition 1
ǫA,pl
ǫA,ph
ǫB,pl
ǫB,ph

ǫGk ,h · ǫGl ,k
}ǫL,pl ,
ǫGk ,k
ǫG ,h · ǫGl ,k
= ǫπl ,h ǫH,pl = {ǫGl ,h − k
}ǫH,pl ,
ǫGk ,k
ǫG ,l · ǫGh ,k
= ǫπh ,l ǫL,ph = {ǫGh ,l − k
}ǫL,ph ,
ǫGk ,k
ǫG ,l · ǫGh ,k
}ǫH,ph ,
= ǫπh ,h ǫH,ph = {−ǫGh ,l + k
ǫGk ,k
= ǫπl ,l ǫL,pl = {−ǫGl ,h +

(3.43)
(3.44)
(3.45)
(3.46)

where ǫx,y is the elasticity of x w.r.t. y.
We can consider two special cases in which productivity is invariant when policy is changed.
The first case arises if the two types of workers are perfect substitutes, so that the production part of the model is equivalent to a model with homogeneous workers. In this case
the invariance of productivity is not very surprising. Any drop in labor leads to a drop in
capital, such that the capital-labor ratio remains unchanged. Since labor productivity is
a function of the capital-labor ratio, it does not change either.
The assumption that the two labor inputs are perfect substitutes implies that Gll =
Ghh = Glh and that Gkl = Gkh and it implies the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Special Case: L and H are Perfect Substitutes) If the two labor
inputs l and h are perfect substitutes, then the labor productivities do not change with
changes in labor inputs: ǫπl ,l = ǫπh ,h = ǫπl ,h = ǫπl ,h = 0.
A similar logic applies when one of the two labor inputs is unrelated to the other labor
input and capital, that is, either Glh = 0 and Gkl = 0 or Glh = 0 and Gkh = 0. In each
of these two cases, the economy consists of two unrelated economies, each of which has
only one type of worker. Since “both economies” have a CRS production function with a
representative agent, the previous proposition applies.
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Proposition 3 (Special Case: L and H are Unrelated Inputs) If either Glh = 0
and Gkl = 0 or Glh = 0 and Gkh = 0, then productivity remains unchanged: ǫπl ,l =
ǫπh ,h = ǫπl ,h = ǫπl ,h = 0.
The production function we use in this paper does not fall into one of the two special
cases. Instead it implies the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Glh ≥ 0 and Gkl Gkh ≥ 0, where at least one inequality is strict.
With this assumption, we can show that productivity indeed changes when the policy
parameter z is changed and we know the sign of this change. The key step is to show
that labor productivity changes if the amount of labor input is changed. The reason why
these changes are not zero is that the above logic does not fully apply anymore. With a
representative agent, a fully flexible capital stock adjusts to keep the capital-labor ratio
and thus labor productivity constant. If, instead, capital was fixed or not fully flexible,
labor productivity would increase in response to a decrease in labor. With two types
of labor a similar effect obtains. Capital cannot fully adjust to keep the two capitallabor ratios constant. Instead, there is only partial adjustment, as would be the case
with a representative agent if the capital stock is a fixed factor. As a consequence, labor
productivity is not constant. The next proposition states this and also establishes how the
functions A and B respond to changes in pl and ph .
Proposition 4 If assumption 1 holds, then
ǫπl ,l , ǫπh ,h , Apl , Bph < 0,

(3.47)

ǫπl ,h , ǫπh ,l , Aph , Bpl > 0,

(3.48)

Once the signs of the derivatives of the functions A and B are known, the last step is easy:
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Proposition 5

It also holds that

∂pl
∂z l

< 1 and

−Apl
∂pl
=
> 0,
∂z l
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.49)

−Bpl
∂ph
=
< 0,
l
∂z
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.50)

−Aph
∂pl
< 0,
=
h
∂z
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.51)

−Bph
∂ph
> 0.
=
h
∂z
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.52)

∂ph
∂z h

< 1, so that

∂(pl −z l )
∂z l

< 0 and

∂(ph −z h )
∂z h

< 0.

What does this mean for employment changes?
Once the change in productivity is known, it is sufficient to look at equations (3.35) and
(3.36) to figure out the change in employment. For example, if p−z increases, employment
increases, and if p − z decreases, employment decreases.
More generally, the change in total employment l + h in response to a change in z l is:
ǫl+h,z l

∂ph z l
∂pl
)
+
H
+
L
)
h
l
p
z
∂z l
∂z l l + h
l
h
= (ǫL,pl ǫpl ,z l + ǫL,z l )
+ ǫH,ph ǫph ,z l
,
l+h
l+h
= ((Lpl

(3.53)

which means that the total employment change is a weighted sum of the change in l and
in h. Similarly, the change in total employment in response to a change in z h is:
ǫl+h,z h

∂pl z h
∂ph
+
H
)
h ) + Lp l
z
∂z h
∂z h l + h
h
l
= (ǫH,ph ǫph ,z h + ǫH,z h )
+ ǫL,pl ǫpl ,z h
.
l+h
l+h
= ((Hph

(3.54)

The total change, if z l and z h go up by 1% equals
ǫl+h,z l + ǫl+h,z h .
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(3.55)

This expression equals
ǫl+h,z l + ǫl+h,z h =

(3.56)

l
h
(ǫ l (ǫ l h + ǫpl ,z l ) + ǫL,z l ) +
(ǫ h (ǫ h l + ǫph ,z h ) + ǫH,z h )
l + h L,p p ,z
l + h H,p p ,z
ǫL,pl
l
h ǫH,ph
(
(ǫπl ,h ǫH,z h + ǫπl ,l ǫL,z l ) + ǫL,z l ) +
(
(ǫπh ,l ǫL,z l + ǫπh ,h ǫH,z h ) + ǫH,z h )
l+h ϑ
l+h ϑ
ǫπl ,l
ǫπh ,h
h
l
(ǫL,pl (
(ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h ) + ǫL,z l ) +
(ǫH,ph (
(ǫH,z h − ǫL,z l ) + ǫH,z h ),
l+h
ϑ
l+h
ϑ
where ϑ = 1 − Apl − Bph , which is positive under Assumption 1 (as established in Proposition 4). This expression is quite insightful. The change in l−productivity pl due to a
change in z equals ϑ1 (ǫπl ,h ǫH,z h + ǫπl ,l ǫL,z l ) and similarly the change of the h−productivity
ph equals

1
ϑ (ǫπ h ,l ǫL,z l

+ ǫπh ,h ǫH,z h ). If these changes are zero, this means productivity is

constant, and the change in employment would equal
h
l
ǫ l+
ǫ h,
l + h L,z
l + h H,z

(3.57)

which is a weighted sum of the changes in l and in h. This composition effect strictly
dampens the change in employment (and thus unemployment) relative to the group effects,
whenever one group is more responsive to policy than the other group, for example, if
|ǫL,z l | > |ǫH,z h |.
If, however, productivity responds to changes in z, the response of group employment
changes. If productivity increases in response to an increase in z, the employment effect
is mitigated (p − z decreases by less); if productivity decreases in response to an increase
in z, the employment effect is amplified (p − z decreases by more).
Whether productivity increases or decreases for group l and group h is described by the
signs of

ǫπh ,h
ϑ (ǫL,z l

− ǫH,z h ) and of

ǫπh ,h
ϑ (ǫH,z h

− ǫL,z l ). Multiplying these expressions with

ǫL,pl and ǫH,ph , respectively, translates the productivity changes into employment changes
(higher productivity leads to higher employment).
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One implication of the above expression is that the change in employment is equal to
that with constant productivity if ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h = 0 (both types of labor respond in the
same way to changes in unemployment insurance), namely,
Proposition 6 If ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h = 0, then productivity does not change and the change in
total employment equals
ǫl+h,z l + ǫl+h,z h =

l
h
ǫL,z l +
ǫ h,
l+h
l + h H,z

(3.58)

because in this case productivity would not move (endogenously).
Furthermore, it follows that if one group has a stronger labor demand elasticity, for
example, group L (ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h < 0), then the productivity of this group increases and the
drop in employment is mitigated, whereas the productivity of the other group decreases
(since ǫL,pl > 0, ǫpl ,L < 0, ǫH,ph > 0, ǫph ,H < 0).
Proposition 7 If ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h < 0, then pl increases and ph decreases. As a consequence
the employment response of group l is mitigated (relative to constant productivity) and the
employment response of group h is amplified (relative to constant productivity).
The overall effect on employment due to the change in productivity would be (since
ǫph ,H =

lpl
ǫ )
hph pl ,L

ǫπl ,l
ǫπh ,h
h
l
(ǫL,pl (
(ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h )) +
(ǫH,ph (
(ǫH,z h − ǫL,z l ))
l+h
ϑ
l+h
ϑ
pl
l ǫπl ,l
(ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h )(ǫL,pl − h ǫH,ph ),
=
l+h ϑ
p
which is positive if

pl
ph

(3.59)

is not substantially larger than one (if group h are high-skilled

workers with lower relative z and higher productivity, this conclusion obviously holds).
Proposition 8 The overall effect on employment due to the change in productivity equals
pl
l ǫπl ,l
(ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h )(ǫL,pl − h ǫH,ph ),
l+h ϑ
p
which is positive if

pl
ph

is not substantially larger than one.
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(3.60)

Comparative statics
Consider the impact of different parameter values on the overall effect on employment in
equation (3.60).
Proposition 9 Consider the employment effect due to productivity changes:
- Skill premium: A decrease in

pl
ph

increases the effect if ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h > 0.

- Preferences: An increase in ǫL,z l − ǫH,z h (> 0) (for example if z l − z h increases)
increases the effect.
- Production: Any change in the production function that lowers ǫπl ,l < 0 increases
the effect. This would happen if one of the positive values Glh , Glk , Ghk increases.

3.5.2

Quantitative Evaluation

In this section we investigate quantitatively the effect of labor, sales and capital income tax
rates on unemployment and productivity. In each experiment we keep all the parameter
values the same as in our benchmark calibration except for increasing the value of nonmarket activity z in the case of a labor tax or decreasing labor productivity p in case of a
sales or capital income tax. An increase in the labor income tax rate by one percentage
H

L

z
z
, 1−0.01
). A one percentage point increase
point amounts to increasing (z L , z H ) to ( 1−0.01

in the sales tax rate leads to a decrease of labor productivity from (pL , pH ) to ((1 −
0.01)pL , (1 − 0.01)pH ). Finally a one percentage point increase in the capital income tax
rate lowers the return on capital r to (1 − 0.01)r, as described above.
In all these experiments we assume that the value of non-market activity is invariant
with respect to tax policy.19 This is obviously a strong assumption. For example, unemployed workers also have to pay a sales tax and thus suffer from a tax increase to the extent
19

Note, that as we mentioned above the increase in labor tax is equivalent to an increase in z. This does

not contradict the invariance assumption because there are no additional effects of the tax change on z.
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that z measures not only the value of leisure but also receiving unemployment benefits
or being self-employed. For example, if a third of the value of z reflects unemployment
insurance, then the value of z should be decreased by a third of a percentage point dampening the policy effects by about a third. A similar argument applies to a labor income
tax rate if unemployment benefits are taxed as in, e.g., the U.S., or are determined as a
fraction of after-tax wages, as in, e.g., Germany. If the latter case, an increase in labor tax
rates lowers the net wage and thus unemployment benefits for a fixed replacement ratio.
Finally, we did not model a direct link between the level of productivity and z. It is likely,
however, that such a relationship exists. Hall and Milgrom (2008) introduce curvature
into preferences in the MP model. With some assumption on preference parameters (they
assume preferences inconsistent with balanced growth) they derive z as a function of consumption levels of employed and unemployed workers (which would be affected by, e.g.,
permanent changes in productivity). The RBC model with balanced growth preferences
may provide some guidance to the direction and magnitude of the impact of a change in
p on z. For example, a change in capital income tax rate in that model has no effect
on employment (Prescott (2004)). This would correspond to z decreasing by the same
amount as p in response to an increase in τk . Therefore the numbers found here should
be considered upper bounds on policy effects. However, this reasoning does not affect our
comparison of policy effects in models with endogenous and exogenous productivity since
we compute percentage differences.
The results of performing these experiments are presented in Column 1 of Table 3.4.
For labor income tax rates we find that the overall unemployment rate increases by 6.7%
(from 7.0% to 7.5%), the low skill unemployment rate increases by 6.6% (from 8.6% to
9.2%), and the high skill unemployment rate increases by 7.5% (from 2.7% to 2.9%). For
the sales tax the findings are very similar (as they would also be in an RBC model with
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Walrasian labor markets). The overall unemployment rate increases by 7.3%, the low skill
unemployment rate increases by 7.1%, and the high skill unemployment rate increases
by 9.1%. Finally, for the capital income tax we find that the overall unemployment rate
increases by 0.9%, the low skill unemployment rate increases by 0.8%, and the high skill
unemployment rate increases by 1.9%.
Section 3.5.1 implies that the change in unemployment can be decomposed into the
effect due to productivity changes and a composition effect. Column 2 of Table 3.4 illustrates that with a constant level of productivity, the response of low-skilled unemployment
to the same increase in labor tax rates would be to increase by 8.5% and high-skilled
unemployment would increase by 7.2% leading to the overall increase in unemployment
with unchanged productivity of 8.4%. The endogenous change in productivity reduces
the strength of these effects. As reported in Table 3.5, productivity of low-skilled workers
increases by 0.194% and productivity of high skilled decreases by 0.028%. This accounts
for the much smaller increases in unemployment in the model with endogenous productivity, with the extent of the difference reported in Column 3 of Table 3.4. Tables 3.4
and 3.5 show that the effects of changes in sales taxes are very similar to the effects of
changing the labor tax. In both cases the endogenous change in productivity dampens the
effects of changes in tax rates by about 25%. The effects of changes in capital income tax
rates are dampened even stronger, by about 38%. Since capital income tax affects labor
productivity only indirectly, the unemployment rate responds by less than in the case of
labor or sale taxes.
These policy effects are much lower than those implied by the standard MP model
with homogeneous workers. A meaningful comparison of the size of policy effects between
the two models requires that they both generate the same amount of volatility in market
tightness. Otherwise, one model could generate small policy effects just because it does
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Table 3.4: Semi-Elasticities of Unemployment with Respect to Changes in Tax Rates.

Endogenous Prod.

Exogenous Prod.

Difference

(1)

(2)

(3)

Labor Income Tax
Overall Unemployment

6.705

8.409

25.416

Low Skilled Unemployment

6.611

8.547

29.291

High Skilled Unemployment

7.504

7.238

-3.545

Sales Tax
Overall Unemployment

7.343

9.161

24.749

Low Skilled Unemployment

7.139

9.186

28.668

High Skilled Unemployment

9.077

8.951

-1.389

Capital Income Tax
Overall Unemployment

0.907

1.249

37.689

Low Skilled Unemployment

0.793

1.274

60.830

High Skilled Unemployment

1.887

1.032

-45.312

Note: Entries are semi-elasticities with exogenous and endogenous productivity: percentage changes of
overall unemployment, high skilled unemployment and low skilled unemployment in response to a one
percentage point increase in the labor income tax rate, the sales tax rate and the capital income tax rate,
respectively. The column “Difference” reports the percentage difference between Columns 1 and 2.
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Table 3.5: Percentage Change of Productivity in Response to Changes in Tax Rates.

Endogenous Prod.

Exogenous Prod.

(1)

(2)

Labor Income Tax
Overall Productivity

0.179

0.014

Low Skilled Productivity

0.194

0.000

High Skilled Productivity

-0.028

0.000

Sales Tax
Overall Productivity

0.191

0.010

Low Skilled Productivity

0.204

0.000

High Skilled Productivity

-0.013

0.000

Capital Income Tax
Overall Productivity

-0.127

0.000

Low Skilled Productivity

0.096

0.000

High Skilled Productivity

-0.226

0.000

Note: percentage changes of overall productivity (output per worker), high skilled productivity and low
skilled productivity (both marginal productivities) in response to a one percentage point increase in the
labor income tax rate, the sales tax rate and the capital income tax rate, respectively. Productivity is
before subtracting sales taxes.
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not generate much volatility (an arbitrarily low value of z would ensure this). To generate
a volatility of 0.296 in the linear model requires that z = 0.928 (all other parameters
except for vacancy posting costs are chosen to match the same aggregate statistics as
in our benchmark calibration). For this value of z we find a semi-elasticity of the overall
unemployment rate of 9.5% for sales taxation, 8.6% for labor taxation and 1.2% for capital
taxation.
The results are even stronger if one considers the low wage elasticity calibration. In
that case we have to set z = 0.942 in the standard model to generate a volatility of
0.246, the volatility generated by our model with heterogeneous agents (and a low wage
elasticity) as described in Appendix Table 3.12. This implies a semi-elasticity of 13.3% for
sales taxation, a semi-elasticity of 12.6% for labor taxation and a semi-elasticity of 2.0 for
capital taxation, whereas our model with heterogeneity implies semi-elasticities of 9.3%,
8.7% and 1.2%, respectively.

3.5.3

Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Policy Changes

In the previous sections we have established several results on the effects of changes in labor
taxation, sales taxation and capital income taxation on unemployment and productivity.
We found that the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to labor and sales taxes
are of about equal size, 7%, whereas capital income taxes have only very small effects. We
also showed that an increase in both labor and sales taxes leads to a decrease in the skill
premium since the productivity of low skilled workers increases whereas the productivity
of high skill workers decreases. Furthermore, because of these endogenous productivity
responses, the percentage change in the unemployment rate is higher for high skilled than
for low skilled workers. Due to this neutralizing effect, we do not expect to find that
increases in unemployment are concentrated among low skilled workers. In this section we
use cross-country evidence to verify whether these model predictions are consistent with
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the data. In particular, we ask how much of the differences in unemployment rates between
countries can be accounted for by differences in tax policy. Table 3.6 uses data on tax rates
and unemployment rates for the OECD countries to provide some evidence on the empirical
effects of taxation.20 We regress the log of the unemployment rate on various tax measure.
Thus, the numbers in the table represent the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect
to the respective tax variable. Column (1) establishes that, as expected, capital income
taxes have virtually no effect on unemployment whereas the effects of labor and sales
taxes are substantial and of similar magnitude. We can thus define a tax wedge as the
sum of the labor tax rate and the sales tax rate and we do no expect the results to change.
Column (2), which shows the result from a regression of unemployment on this tax wedge
and capital income taxation, confirms this. A one percentage point increase in the tax
wedge increases unemployment by 8.436 percent. Summing labor and sales taxation seems
also appropriate from a fiscal perspective since different governments may choose different
combinations of sales and labor taxation to generate the same tax revenue. It is then
conceivable that by pure chance high unemployment countries choose, say, labor taxation
and low unemployment countries choose sales taxation. A similar argument could apply to
capital income taxation and unemployment insurance although the revenue from capital
income taxes is much lower than that raised from labor taxes and the expenditures on
unemployment insurance are only a small fraction of government expenditures. However,
summing all these policy rates seems problematic since they have substantially different
20

We use data on effective labor,

capital,

and sales taxes for a number of the OECD

countries over 1965-1996 period provided by Enrique Mendoza on his webpage http://econserver.umd.edu/∼mendoza/pp/taxdata.pdf
structed

using

the

method

described

and
in

.../newtaxdata.pdf.

Mendoza,

Razin,

and

The
Tesar

data

were

(1994).

Data

conon

the unemployment rates for these countries was provided by Jim Costain on his webpage
http://www.econ.upf.edu/∼costain/rbcmatch/webpage/bcui.html.

See Costain and Reiter (2008)

for the detailed description of the data. Since unemployment data used in Costain and Reiter (2008)
refers to five-year averages, we average the tax data similarly in the years when it is available.
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Table 3.6: Evidence on the Effects of Taxes on Unemployment
Tax Measure

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Labor tax

8.465

9.171

Sales tax

7.889

8.314

Capital tax

0.507

Tax Wedge 1

0.518

-0.193

8.436

Tax Wedge 2

(7)

-0.203

3.746

3.129
1.806

No

No

(8)

9.199

Tax Wedge 3
Other controls

(6)

No

No

2.001
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Note: The dependent variable is the log of unemployment rate. The numbers represent the semi-elasticity
of unemployment with respect to the respective tax variable. All regressions include country fixed effects.
Following Nickell and Layard (1999) and Costain and Reiter (2008), Columns 5 through 8 include additional
controls: indices of benefit duration, employment protection, union density, and bargaining coordination,
and the percent of households who are owner-occupiers. Tax Wedge 1 = labor tax rate + sales tax, Tax
Wedge 2 = labor tax rate + sales tax + capital income tax rate, Tax Wedge 3 = labor tax rate + sales
tax + capital income tax rate + replacement rate.

effects on unemployment. Columns (3) and (4) show that indeed the effects of these wedges
are diluted. Finally, Columns (5) - (8) redo the experiments from Columns (1) - (4) but add
the additional controls used by Costain and Reiter (2008) and Nickell and Layard (1999)
that may also affect unemployment. These controls include indices of benefit duration,
employment protection, union density, and bargaining coordination, and the percent of
households who are owner-occupiers. Adding these controls does not significantly affect our
results. We therefore conclude that a one percentage point increase in labor or consumption
tax rates increases unemployment by about 8 percent.21
We now provide evidence for how the differences in tax policies across countries affect
21

An increase in the unemployment rate by 8 percent from 5.7% (sample mean) to 6.16% corresponds

to a decrease of 100 * employment by 0.456 (population has measure one). Gordon (2007) finds similar
numbers in his survey of the literature. He reports −0.47 for the response of hours per capita to tax
changes and about −0.4 for the response of employment per capita.
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Figure 3.1: Skill Premium and Tax Wedge, Men
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the skill premium and the relative unemployment rates for different skill groups. We use
data from a number of the OECD countries from 1996-2000 on the skill premium for both
men and women and for the unemployment rates for college and high school workers.22
22

The data on skill premium come from Strauss and de la Maisonneive (2007). They use households

surveys of the OECD countries in the 1990s to measure the college premium constructed using comparable
definitions of wages and schooling groups across countries. Data on unemployment rates by level of education come from Eurostat Table “Unemployment rates of the population aged 25-64 by level of education.”
Because we have to use different data sources for constructing the variable, they do not always overlap in
their coverage. We have data on skill premia, unemployment rates by skill and tax wedges for Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United
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Figure 3.2: Skill Premium and Tax Wedge, Women
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We compute the average of these premia and unemployment rates for each country and we
also average the tax wedge (sum of labor and sales taxes) for these countries between 19901999.23 Figure ?? confirms the predictions of our theory. We find a significant negative
effect of the tax wedge on the skill premium for both men (significant slope −1.007) and
women (significant slope −1.271) and virtually no effect on the ratio of low skill to high
States. For Norway and Switzerland we have only data on tax wedges and unemployment.
23
We average the tax wedge over a longer time period to maximize the number of countries in our sample.
Restricting ourselves to the period 1995-1999 would shrink our sample to G-7 countries only. Our finding
are insensitive to this choice, however.
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Figure 3.3: Relative Unemployment and Tax Wedge
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skill unemployment (insignificant slope −0.002), echoing the view expressed in Nickell and
Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).

3.6

Conclusion

We extended the basic Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model along two dimensions. First, we allowed for ex-ante heterogeneity between workers, low and high skilled.
Second, we allowed two technology shocks, neutral and investment-specific, to be the driving forces of the economy. Specifically, we integrated the framework of Krusell, Ohanian,
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Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) - a production function with capital-skill complementarity
and two skill-groups - into a business-cycle search and matching model. We calibrated the
model using the approach in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and found that the model
accounts well for the cyclical behavior of labor market variables in the aggregate and for
each demographic group.
Our calibration implies that the flow value of non-market activity of high-skilled workers is considerably lower than the corresponding value for a representative worker in the
model with homogeneous workers. For low-skilled workers the flow value of non-market
activity is slightly higher than the value for a representative worker. Nevertheless, in the
model, as in the data, the unemployment rates for these two groups of workers are highly
and roughly equally volatile over the business cycle. The fact that the unemployment rate
of low-skilled workers is highly volatile is not surprising given the results in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008). The accounting profits that firms make on these workers are small and
thus respond strongly in percentage terms to fluctuations in the marginal product of these
workers. The fact that the unemployment rate of highly skilled workers is also highly
volatile, despite the fact that the accounting profits firms make on them are relatively
large, is due to the higher volatility and the higher persistence of their marginal product
relative to the representative worker case.
We find that the response of unemployment to changes in taxes is substantially lower
in the model with worker heterogeneity than in the model with homogeneous workers if
both models generate the same volatility of market tightness. We show that this difference
in policy effects is due to an endogenous response of productivity. Consider, for example, an increase in labor taxes. Because the flow utility of unemployment for high-skilled
workers is relatively low, a change in taxes does not substantially affect the decisions of
firms to post vacancies in a hope of hiring these workers. Thus, they serve as a fixed fac-
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tor in the aggregate production. Because capital equipment is complementary with these
workers and since the stock of high-skilled workers is little changed, the stock of capital
equipment is little changed as well, even in the long run. In turn, if the productivity
of low-skilled workers remained unchanged, a change in policy that squeezes the profits
that firms make on them would induce firms to post fewer vacancies and the employment
of low-skilled workers would fall. However, as their employment falls, their productivity
increases because capital equipment and high-skilled workers remain in place. This increase in productivity of low-skilled workers acts to restore the profits that firms make on
these workers and counteracts the effect of the change in the policy. Thus, the endogenous
response of productivity significantly dampens the effect of a change in taxes on unemployment. Note that these effects are driven by the presence of worker heterogeneity and not
by the curvature in the production per se. With a one-sector Cobb-Douglas production
function, capital would adjust after a change in policy to keep the capital-labor ratio and
thus productivity constant.
We have shown that the semielasticity of unemployment with respect to changes in the
tax wedge implied by the model is quantitatively consistent with the data. Moreover, the
model matches the evidence that countries with higher tax rates have higher aggregate
productivity, lower skill premia, and higher unemployment rates among both high- and
low-skilled workers. This evidence provides support for the key mechanism in the model
based on worker heterogeneity.
Endogeneity of productivity in our model would also dampen the effects of changes in
the generosity of unemployment insurance on unemployment. As mentioned above, we did
not consider these policy experiments in this paper since theory suggests that these policy
effects are small anyway. Faig and Zhang (2008) and Zhang (2008) show that this is the
case once it is taken into account that entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits
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must be earned with employment. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008) argue that the rise
in European unemployment can be accounted for by the increase in the depreciation rate
of human capital upon job displacement interacted with more generous unemployment
insurance in Europe. They do not consider the ability of their model to match business
cycle facts. We think it would be fruitful to take into account the endogenous response
of productivity to policy changes in their framework as well. It is clearly an important
research agenda to sort out the joint effects of tax and benefit policies on unemployment
outcomes.
While we study the effects of worker heterogeneity in the MP model, a number of papers
have recently investigated the quantitative implications of heterogeneity of productivities
across jobs (e.g., Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007), Michelacci and Lopez-Salido
(2007), Pissarides and Vallanti (2007)). Most closely related to our analysis is the contribution by Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007) who study the effects of labor market
policies, including tax wedges, in determining the effect of the faster capital embodied
capital change on unemployment. They focus on steady states and do not investigate the
response of unemployment to cyclical fluctuations in productivity. Their analysis abstracts
from the endogenous response of productivity to changes in tax policies and thus likely
features similar elasticities of unemployment with respect to cyclical fluctuations in productivity and taxes. Introducing worker heterogeneity along the lines of our paper into
their model would likely help match the differences in these responses in the data. This
appears an interesting extension to pursue.
Our analysis in this paper can be described as a comparison of two stationary economies
(featuring aggregate shocks to productivity and price of capital equipment that do not
have a trend) characterized by different tax rates. Thus, we have abstracted from secular
changes in productivity and in the price of capital equipment. Relatedly, we did not study
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the secular increase in the college premium observed in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. A
number of papers, including Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Shi (2002),
Wong (2003), among others, have explored this issue in the MP model that includes worker
heterogeneity but the productivity changes are exogenous. Krusell, Ohanian, Rı́os-Rull,
and Violante (2000) study the effect of a decline in the price of capital equipment on the
college premium in a frictionless model. It seems to be an interesting extension to evaluate
the effects of a decline in the price of capital equipment in our model and to compare the
response of wage inequality, in particular, across countries with different levels of the tax
wedge.
Finally, while our focus in this paper is on unemployment, Prescott (2004), Rogerson
(2008), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), among others, have studied the effects of tax
policies on total hours worked using versions of the real business cycle model. The RBC
model features the same trade-off as the basic MP model. As is shown in Prescott (2004),
the standard RBC model with labor supply elasticity equal to 3 matches the cross-country
differences in hours worked in response to differences in taxes. However, as pointed out
in Hansen (1985), with this labor supply elasticity the RBC model generates only about
one half of the observed volatility of hours worked over the business cycle. A higher
labor supply elasticity is required to match the cyclical movements in hours. However, a
higher elasticity would imply counterfactually strong policy effects. Incorporating worker
heterogeneity into the RBC model along the lines proposed in this paper will help break
the close linkage between the response of hours to changes in productivity and the response
to changes in tax rates. Just as the version of the MP model that we proposed, a version of
the RBC model with such a mechanism can feature a strong propagation of productivity
shocks and simultaneously weaker policy effects.
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3.7
3.7.1

Appendix
Data and Variable Construction Procedures

Aggregate Data
Output. Output is BLS non-farm business output.24
Employment. Aggregate employment is computed using monthly Current Population
Surveys (MCPS) from January 1976 to December 2006. MCPS data are available at
http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html. To make this measure of employment consistent
with the aggregate measure of output we exclude government, private households and
unpaid family workers. We keep government agriculture workers because the CPS did
not distinguish between private and government workers in agriculture before July 1985.
Since there are only a few government agriculture workers in each sample after June 1985,
they do not affect the results. The only inconsistency is that BLS business output does
not include the output of non-profit institutions but our measure of employment includes
employees of those institutions (because we cannot identify these people in the data).
The resulting monthly employment series is seasonally adjusted using the ratio to moving
average method and averaged into quarterly series.
Productivity. Aggregate productivity is defined as a ratio of output and employment.
Wages. Aggregate wage series is constructed as BLS labor share in non-farm business
sector times productivity.
Capital Structures. We construct quarterly quality-adjusted stock of capital structures
using the perpetual inventory method, ks,t+1 = (1 − dst )kst + ist . Annual series for depreci24

BLS data used are available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?pr.
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ation of capital structures, dst , for the period from 1947 to 2000 comes from Cummins and
Violante (2002). To compute the quarterly series we assume constant depreciation during
a year. For the years 2001 through 2006 we assume that dst is constant and equal to its
value in the year 2000. Quality-adjusted investment in structures, ist , is constructed using
private fixed investment in structures (BEA-NIPA Table 5.3.5) deflated by the price index
of non-durables consumption and services, P CON St .25 P CON St is calculated using a
Tornqvist procedure. If we have N goods, the change in the price index is
∆P CON St =

N
X
i=1

log



pit
pit−1



sit + sit−1
,
2

and the price index is calculated then recursively
P CON St = P CON St−1 exp(∆P CON St ),
where the initial value for the price index is set equal to 1. The price index for good
i, pit , i = non-durables consumption, services, is taken from BEA-NIPA Table 2.3.4 and
the nominal share for good i, sit , is calculated using BEA-NIPA Table 2.3.5. The initial
value (year 1947) for the stock of capital structures comes from BEA-FAT Table 2.1. The
obtained series is then truncated for the years before 1976.
Capital Equipment. Quarterly quality-adjusted stock of capital equipment is also constructed using the perpetual inventory method, ke,t+1 = (1−det )ket +iet . Annual series for
depreciation of capital equipment, det , is also taken from Cummins and Violante (2002),
assuming that det is constant during a year and equal to its value in the year 2000 during the period from 2001 to 2006. We construct the series for nominal investment in
equipment as the sum of private fixed investment in equipment (BEA-NIPA Table 5.3.5),
changes in inventories (BEA-NIPA Table 1.1.5) and consumer durables (BEA-NIPA Table
25

As a robustness check we computed the price index of non-durables consumption and services excluding

energy and housing and did not get any significant changes in the results.
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1.1.5) and deflate it by the price index for equipment investment, P EQt , to get iet . We use
P EQt series constructed by Schorfheide, Rios-Rull, Fuentes-Albero, Santaeulalia-Llopis,
and Kryshko (2007). It is constructed using the annual price index of equipment investment computed by Cummins and Violante (2002) and imputing the quarterly movements
of the official NIPA price index of equipment investment.26 The initial value (year = 1947)
for the stock of capital equipment comes from BEA-FAT Table 2.1.The obtained series is
then truncated for the years before 1976.27
Skill-Group Employment and Wages
The sources of employment and wage data by skill group are monthly Current Population Surveys (MCPS) from January 1976 to December 2006 and CPS Outgoing Rotation
Groups (ORG) covering the period January 1979 to December 2006. MCPS data are
available at http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html and CPS ORG data are available at
http://www.ceprdata.org/cps/org index.php. To compute the employment series by skill
group we use the same procedure as for aggregate employment.
To compute wage series for skilled and unskilled categories we use data constructed
by Schmitt (2003) from CPS ORG. Following the approach adopted in Krusell, Ohanian,
Rı́os-Rull, and Violante (2000) we divide our workers into 198 groups based on their
demographic characteristics. There are 11 five-year age groups, 3 race groups (white,
black and others), 2 gender groups and 3 education groups (less than high school diploma,
high school diploma and college degree and more). Each group, g, is defined by age, race,
gender and education. The set of groups is denoted by G. The measure of the group
26
27

See Schorfheide, Rios-Rull, Fuentes-Albero, Santaeulalia-Llopis, and Kryshko (2007) for details.
As a robustness check we computed the series for the stocks of capital structures and equipment for

the period from 1976 to 2006 using 1976 stock as an initial value. There were no important changes in the
results.
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hourly wage is defined as
wgt =

P

i∈g

wit hit µit

P

i∈g

µit

,

where t = 01.1979, ..., 12.2006, µit - individual’s i earnings weight, hit - individual’s i usual
weekly hours, wit - the measure of individual i hourly wage constructed by Schmitt (2003)
from CPS ORG. This measure uses a log-normal imputation to adjust for top-coding,
trims data below US$1 and US$100 per hour (in constant 2002 dollars), includes overtime,
tips and commissions for hourly paid workers and imputes usual weekly hours for those
who report “hours vary” starting from 1994.
The measure of wages for skilled and unskilled workers in period t is constructed as
follows
Wtj =

X

wgt µ̄jg ,

g∈Gjt

where j ∈ {u, s} indicates unskilled and skilled type, respectively, µ̄jg =

PT

t=1

µjgt

T

average proportion of group g workers in Gj , T - number of time periods, µjgt =

- temporal
P
µ
P i∈g i,t .
j µi,t
i∈Gt

The resulting monthly series are deflated using monthly CPI-U, seasonally adjusted using
the ratio to moving average method and averaged into quarterly series.
Technology Shocks
The series of investment-specific technology change is calculated as
qt =

P CON St
.
P EQt

To measure neutral technology shocks we use the production function parameters calibrated in Section 3.3. The monthly skill-group employment series constructed above are
seasonally adjusted using the ratio to moving average method and averaged into annual
series denoted by Lt and Ht , respectively. Low-skilled labor lt and high-skilled labor ht
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are normalized as follows
Lt

lt = 2.6379 ∗ 0.9162 PT

t=1 Lt /T

and

ht = 0.9737 PT

Ht

t=1 Ht /T

, t = 1976, .., 2006

, t = 1976, .., 2006,

where 2.6379 is the measure of low-skilled workers,28 and 0.9162 and 0.9737 are employment rates for low-skilled and high-skilled workers, respectively.
The series of neutral technology change is calculated as
Output

At =
α
kst

h

µltσ

+ (1 − µ)

ρ
λket

+ (1 −

σ


λ)hρt ρ

i 1−α .
σ

Job-Finding and Job Separation Probabilities
To calculate job-finding and job separation probabilities we employ Shimer (2005b) two
state approach. Assuming constant labor force,
ut+1 = ut (1 − ft ) + ust+1 ,
where ut+1 the number of unemployed individuals in month t, ust+1 the number of individuals unemployed for less than one month in month t, and ft ≡

m(u,v)
u

is a probability that

an unemployed individual finds a job. The measure of job separation probability is29
st =

ut+1 − (1 − ft )ut
.
et

We use basic monthly CPS data for the number of unemployed individuals and number of
people unemployed for less than 4 weeks to construct ft and sf for skilled and unskilled
categories.
28

This number is calculated as the average of

n

Lt
Ht

o

t=01.1976,..,12.2006

. The measure of high-skilled workers

is normalized to 1.
29
Note that this formula does not take time aggregation into account, since in our model inputs are
measured at weekly frequencies.
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Until 1994, all unemployed workers were asked about the duration of unemployment.
Starting from 1994, the BLS adds the intervening time for unemployed individuals who
have been asked about the duration of unemployment in the previous month. To account
for this change in methodology we follow the procedure in Shimer (2005b) and multiply all
computed series for short-term unemployment by 1.1 after 1994. The resulting monthly
series are seasonally adjusted using the ratio to moving average method.

3.7.2

Computation

We use the free-entry condition (3.15) and flow equation for the surplus (3.16) to derive
the following difference equations in θT :
cTxt
δφT (θxTt )

= Ext {(1 − β T )(pTxt+1 − z T ) − cTxt β T θxTt +

(1 − sT )cTxt+1
φT (θxTt+1 )

}.

(3.61)

We solve this system of difference equations to find θT as a function of x. Next, we simulate
the model to generate artificial time series for neutral and investment-specific shocks, stocks
of capital structures and equipment, unemployment, vacancies, and wages for each of the
two worker types and the aggregate economy. To do so, we start with an initial value
for unemployment of the two groups of workers, as well as neutral and investment-specific
productivity shocks. Using the law of motion for employment, we compute next period’s
employment level nlt+1 = lt+1 and nht+1 = ht+1 . Using these numbers compute capital
ke,t+1 and ks,t+1 from the corresponding first-order conditions. Next, we draw a new pair
of shocks to productivity and the price of capital equipment according to the stochastic
process describing their evolution. We then know θT and, thus, the job-finding rate and
the new unemployment rate. Iterating this procedure generates the time series of interest.
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3.7.3

Proofs

Implicit differentiation
We show how productivity changes in response to changes in z, where pl and ph are the
fixed point of

It holds that




This implies that



∂pl
∂z l
∂ph
∂z l

A(pl , z l , ph , z h ) − pl = 0,

(3.62)

B(pl , z l , ph , z h ) − ph = 0.

(3.63)

Apl − 1

Aph

Bp l

Bp h − 1





 = −1/DD 

 
·

∂pl
∂z l
∂ph
∂z l





=

Bp h − 1

−Aph

−Bpl

Apl − 1

−Az l
−Bz l

 
·



.

Az l
Bz l



,

where DD := (1 − Apl )(1 − Bph ) − Aph Bpl . For the derivatives it holds (because equation
(3.33) depends only on p − z) that
Apl = −Az l ,

(3.64)

Aph = −Az h ,

(3.65)

Bpl = −Bz l ,

(3.66)

Bpl = −Bz l .

(3.67)

−Apl (1 − Bph ) − Aph Bpl
∂pl
=
,
l
∂z
(1 − Apl )(1 − Bph ) − Aph Bpl

(3.68)

−Bpl (1 − Apl ) − Apl Bpl
∂ph
=
.
l
∂z
(1 − Apl )(1 − Bph ) − Aph Bpl

(3.69)

This means that
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To simplify this expression, we have to compute
First compute

∂π l ∂π l ∂π h
∂l , ∂h , ∂l

and

∂π h
∂h .

∂π l
∂l :

∂π l
∂l

= Glk kl + Gll

(3.70)

−Glk
+ Gll
Gkk
k
Gkh h
= Glk + Glk
+ Gll
l
Gkk l
h
Gkl
=
(−Glh + Gkh
),
l
Gkk
= Glk

where the first equality follows from implicit differentiation of (3.32) and the second and
third equalities are a consequence of constant returns to scale (which implies that Gk and
Gl are homogeneous of degree zero):

Now compute

Gkk k + Gkh h + Gkl l = 0,

(3.71)

Glk k + Glh h + Gll l = 0.

(3.72)

∂π l
∂h

(3.73)

∂π l
∂h :

Gkh
+ Glh
Gkk
l ∂π l
.
= −
h ∂l

= −Glk

Making use of similar arguments, it also holds that
∂π h
∂h

= Ghk kh + Ghh

(3.74)

−Ghk
+ Ghh
Gkk
k
Gkl l
= Ghk + Ghk
+ Ghh
h
Gkk h
l
Gkl
=
(−Glh + Gkh
),
h
Gkk
= Ghk

and
∂π h
∂l

Gkl
+ Glh
Gkk
h ∂π h
,
= −
l ∂h

= −Ghk
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(3.75)

and
∂π l
h2 ∂π h
= 2
.
∂l
l ∂h
We can now simplify

∂π l
∂z l

and

(3.76)

∂π h
:
∂z l

∂π h
∂π l
∂π h
∂π l
Lpl )(
Hp H ) − (
HpH )(
L l)
∂l
∂h
∂h
∂l p
∂π l ∂π h
−l ∂π l −h ∂π h
= Lp l Hp H (
−(
) = 0,
∂l ∂h
h ∂l l ∂h

Apl Bph − Aph Bpl

= (

(3.77)

−Apl
∂pl
,
=
l
∂z
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.78)

−Bpl
∂ph
.
=
1 − Apl − Bph
∂z l

(3.79)

and, thus,

By the same arguments it follows that
−Aph
∂pl
,
=
h
1 − Apl − Bph
∂z

(3.80)

−Bph
∂ph
=
.
h
∂z
1 − Apl − Bph

(3.81)

Proof of Proposition 1
Using the above expressions for

∂π l ∂π l ∂π h
∂l , ∂h , ∂l

and

∂π h
∂h ,

we find that

h
Gkl
(−Glh + Gkh
)
l
p
Gkk
ǫG ,h · ǫGl ,k
= −ǫGl ,h + k
ǫGk ,k

ǫπl ,l =

ǫπl ,h =

Gkl
h
)
(−Glh + Gkh
l
Gkk
p

(3.82)

(3.83)

= −ǫπl ,l
Gkl
l
(−Glh + Gkh
)
h
p
Gkk
ǫG ,l · ǫGh ,k
= −ǫGh ,l + k
ǫGk ,k

ǫπh ,h =

=

lpl
ǫ l
hph π ,l
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(3.84)

ǫπh ,l = −Ghk

Gkl
+ Glh
Gkk

(3.85)

= −ǫπh ,h
From the definitions of the functions A, B, π l and π h it follows that
ǫA,pl

= ǫπl ,l ǫL,pl ,

(3.86)

ǫA,ph

= ǫπl ,h ǫH,pl ,

(3.87)

ǫB,pl

= ǫπh ,l ǫL,ph ,

(3.88)

ǫB,ph

= ǫπh ,h ǫH,ph ,

(3.89)

which proves the proposition.

Proof of Proposition 2
CRS and perfect substitutes imply that
Gkk k + Gkh h + Gkl l = Gkk k + Gkl (h + l) = 0,

(3.90)

Glk k + Glh h + Gkk l = Glk k + Gll (h + l) = 0.

(3.91)

The first equation implies that
(h + l) = −

Gkl
k.
Gkk

(3.92)

Plugging this into the second equation implies that
Glk k + Gll −

Gkl
k = 0.
Gkk

(3.93)

This implies that
ǫπl ,l =
=

Gkl
h
)
(−Glh + Gkh
Gkk
pl
h
Gkl
) = 0.
(−Gll + Gkl
l
Gkk
p

(3.94)

Noting that all of the four elasticities are just a multiple of each other concludes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Follows directly from inspection of

∂π l
∂l .

Proof of Proposition 4
Follows directly from Assumption 1 and Proposition 1.

Proof of Proposition 5
How the derivatives of p with respect to z are related to the derivatives of A and B was
shown above. The sign of these derivatives then follows immediately from Proposition 3.

Proof of Propositions 6, 7, 8 and 9
The derivation of these results is discussed in the main text, which is based on Equation
(3.56).
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3.7.4

Appendix Tables
Table 3.7: Matching the Calibration Targets with Low Wage Elasticity.

Target

Value
Data

Model

1.

Elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫw,p

0.500

0.498

2.

Relative elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫwH ,p /ǫwL ,p

1.770

1.775

3.

Skilled job-finding rate, f H

0.106

0.105

4.

Unskilled job-finding rate, f L

0.127

0.126

5.

Skilled average market tightness, θH

1.044

1.039

6.

Unskilled average market tightness, θL

0.586

0.584

7.

Elasticity of agg. job-finding wrt agg. market tightness, ǫf,θ

0.500

0.497

8.

Relative elas. of job-finding wrt agg. mrkt tightness, ǫf H ,θ /ǫf L ,θ

1.335

1.335

9.

Standard deviation of capital structures

0.003

0.003

10.

Standard deviation of capital equipment

0.010

0.010

Note: The table describes the model’s performance in matching the calibration targets, including low wage
elasticity.
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Table 3.8: Calibrated Parameter Values with Low Wage Elasticity.

Parameter

Definition

Value

zH

skilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.848

zL

unskilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.945

βH

skilled workers’ bargaining power

0.043

βL

unskilled workers’ bargaining power

0.072

γH

skilled matching function elasticity

0.238

γL

unskilled matching function elasticity

0.544

χH

skilled matching function efficiency

0.104

χL

unskilled matching function efficiency

0.165

d∗s

depreciation factor of capital structures

11.800

d∗e

depreciation factor of capital equipment

1.460

Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the low wage elasticity calibration.
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Table 3.9: Results from the Calibrated Model with Low Wage Elasticity.

Statistic

Value
Data, 1951-2004

Model

LM

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.

St. dev. of agg. productivity, p

0.013

0.013

0.013

2.

Autocorr. of agg. productivity, p

0.765

0.765

0.765

3.

St. dev. of agg. unemployment, u

0.125

0.104

0.071

4.

St. dev. of agg. vacancies, v

0.139

0.142

0.101

5.

St. dev. of agg. market tightness, θ

0.259

0.246

0.163

6.

Corr. of agg. unemployment and vacancies

-0.919

-0.782

-0.780

1.

St. dev. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.018

—

2.

Autocorr. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.779

—

3.

St. dev. of skilled unemployment, uH

—

0.138

—

4.

St. dev. of skilled vacancies, v H

—

0.103

—

5.

St. dev. of skilled market tightness, θH

—

0.207

—

1.

St. dev. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.013

—

2.

Autocorr. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.754

—

3.

St. dev. of unskilled unemployment, uL

—

0.100

—

4.

St. dev. of unskilled vacancies, v L

—

0.170

—

5.

St. dev. of unskilled market tightness, θL

—

0.258

—

Note: Column (1) contains aggregate statistics computed over the 1951:1 to 2004:4 period as in Shimer
(2005a). Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005b) report virtually identical numbers. In Column (1)
seasonally adjusted unemployment, u, is constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). The seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index, v, is constructed
by the Conference Board. Both u and v are quarterly averages of monthly series. Average labor productivity
p is seasonally adjusted real average output per person in the non-farm business sector, constructed by the
BLS from the National Income and Product Accounts and the Current Employment Statistics. Column
(2) contains the results from the model calibrated with low wage elasticity. Column (3) reproduces the
results from the linear model with homogeneous workers for the same aggregate calibration targets. All
variables are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
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Table 3.10: Matching the Calibration Targets with s = sU .

Target

Value
Data

Model

1.

Elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫw,p

0.670

0.669

2.

Relative elasticity of wages wrt agg. productivity, ǫwH ,p /ǫwL ,p

1.770

1.801

3.

Skilled job-finding rate, f H

0.106

0.105

4.

Unskilled job-finding rate, f L

0.127

0.127

5.

Skilled average market tightness, θH

1.044

1.059

6.

Unskilled average market tightness, θL

0.586

0.604

7.

Elasticity of agg. job-finding wrt agg. market tightness, ǫf,θ

0.500

0.501

8.

Relative elas. of job-finding wrt agg. mrkt tightness, ǫf H ,θ /ǫf L ,θ

1.335

1.346

9.

Standard deviation of capital structures

0.003

0.003

10.

Standard deviation of capital equipment

0.010

0.010

Note: The table describes the model’s performance in matching the calibration targets without distinguishing between the total separation rate and the separation rate into unemployment.
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Table 3.11: Calibrated Parameter Values with s = sU .

Parameter

Definition

Value

zH

skilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.897

zL

unskilled value of non-market activity (share of their productivity)

0.943

βH

skilled workers’ bargaining power

0.064

βL

unskilled workers’ bargaining power

0.098

γH

skilled matching function elasticity

0.230

γL

unskilled matching function elasticity

0.540

χH

skilled matching function efficiency

0.102

χL

unskilled matching function efficiency

0.164

d∗s

depreciation factor of capital structures

11.500

d∗e

depreciation factor of capital equipment

1.420

Note: The table contains the calibrated parameter values in the calibration without distinguishing between
the total separation rate and the separation rate into unemployment.
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Table 3.12: Results from the Calibrated Model with s = sU .

Statistic

Value
Data

Model

LM

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.

St. dev. of agg. productivity, p

0.013

0.013

0.013

2.

Autocorr. of agg. productivity, p

0.765

0.765

0.765

3.

St. dev. of agg. unemployment, u

0.090

0.096

0.061

4.

St. dev. of agg. vacancies, v

0.116

0.130

0.086

5.

St. dev. of agg. market tightness, θ

0.202

0.227

0.139

6.

Corr. of agg. unemployment and vacancies

-0.910

-0.780

-0.780

1.

St. dev. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.018

—

2.

Autocorr. of skilled productivity, pH

—

0.778

—

3.

St. dev. of skilled unemployment, uH

0.111

0.129

—

4.

St. dev. of skilled vacancies, v H

—

0.096

—

5.

St. dev. of skilled market tightness, θH

—

0.192

—

1.

St. dev. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.013

—

2.

Autocorr. of unskilled productivity, pL

—

0.758

—

3.

St. dev. of unskilled unemployment, uL

0.085

0.093

—

4.

St. dev. of unskilled vacancies, v L

—

0.156

—

5.

St. dev. of unskilled market tightness, θL

—

0.238

—

Note: Column (1) reproduces Column (1) of Table 3.3. See notes to that table for details. Column (2)
contains the results from the model calibrated without distinguishing between the total separation rate
and the separation rate into unemployment. Column (3) shows the results from the linear model with
homogeneous workers for the same aggregate calibration targets. All variables are reported in logs as
deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
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